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Envisioning the Constitution
Abstract

If one of the more persistent problems of constitutional interpretation, particularly of the Bill of Rights, is that
we lack a clear view of it, then it would appear that how we see the Constitution is as important as how we
read it. What clauses we see as connected in order to form comprehensive values, such as federalism or rights
protections, are not so much products of constitutional interpretation as constitutional vision. To obtain a
view of the Constitution, we have to do more than derive semantic meaning from diverse articles and clauses.
To have a vision of the Constitution is to have a general attitude of attending to particular matters rather than
others, of connecting these matters to others in particular ways, and of making decisions based on seeing the
matters in a specific light. Vision is the mechanism and metaphor through which attention is focused on
particular constitutional matters. By envisioning the Constitution, one illuminates overall structures as well as
particular meanings. For example, the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is generally not determined by
an interpretation of the clause's text or an "interpretation" of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather by the
way in which the Supreme Court is willing to look at a problem arising under the Equal Protection Clause that is, what level of scrutiny is applied to the issue. Moreover, changed or competing visions drive substantive
changes in the law. The thesis of this Article is that vision, by shaping the grounds for interpretation, is
essential to constitutional law and legal theory.
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If one of the more persistent problems of constitutional
interpretation, particularly of the Bill of Rights, is that “we lack a
1
clear view of it,” then it would appear that how we see the
Constitution is as important as how we read it. What clauses we see as
connected in order to form comprehensive values, such as federalism

*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D., Yale
Law School; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University. I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman in many
ways, not the least for his invaluable encouragement and suggestions for this project.
I would also like to thank Aziz Rana, Adam Livingston, and Amy Sepinwall for their
helpful comments during the earliest stages of this project. Lisa Eichhorn, Robin
Wilson, Josh Eagle, Calvin Massey, Amy Cohen, Jordan Factor, Eric Biber, Brad
Weidenhammer and Holly Crocker have each contributed comments and
suggestions for which I am immensely grateful. I owe special thanks to Andrew
Siegel who has been particularly generous in helping me shape inchoate thoughts
into manageable prose. I have also benefited at various stages from the excellent
research assistance of Kristina Cooper, Jane Merrill, and Cheves Ligon.
1. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xi
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
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or rights protections, are not so much products of constitutional
interpretation as constitutional vision. To obtain a view of the
Constitution, we have to do more than derive semantic meaning from
diverse articles and clauses. To have a vision of the Constitution is to
have a general attitude of attending to particular matters rather than
others, of connecting these matters to others in particular ways, and
of making decisions based on seeing the matters in a specific light.
By envisioning the Constitution, one illuminates overall structures as
well as particular meanings. The thesis of this Article is that vision, by
shaping the grounds for interpretation, is essential to constitutional
law and legal theory.
Recent constitutional “revolutions” driven by federalism concerns
have transformed Commerce Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, and
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. These transformations occur not
only on the basis of new interpretations of old text, but also on the
basis of new visions of constitutional design, purpose, and effect.
Moreover, new constitutional jurisprudence enables new ways of
seeing and inhabiting broader constitutional culture. How one views
constitutional structure and purpose makes possible particular ways
of seeing institutional relations and powers as well as specific rights
and duties. Much has been written on the problems and mechanics
of constitutional interpretation, but little consideration has been
given to the dynamics of constitutional vision.
At times, however, judicial vision takes center stage. When judicial
nominees appear before Senate confirmation hearings, Senators want
more than anything to get a picture of the nominee’s judicial
outlook. Knowing they cannot get specific thoughts about particular
constitutional issues that might come before the court, they
nonetheless scrutinize the nominee’s views on particular aspects of
2
legal doctrine and practice. Since how a judge or Justice sees an
issue is central to both framing and resolving it, a nominating
President, as well as an expectant public, believe that the nominee’s
vision is vital to the future of the Constitution and the culture it
3
serves and creates. As Justice Breyer has noted, “Supreme Court
work leads the Justice to develop a view of the Constitution as a

2. See Jeffrey Rosen, Senators Should Focus on Roberts’ Vision, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July
22, 2005, at 59 (“[T]he Senate should explore Judge Roberts’s judicial philosophy
and temperament . . . [and] his vision of the role of the courts in democracy.”).
3. “A President nominates a candidate to become a Justice because the
President believes that the constitutional vision of the nominee is good for the
country.” Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial
Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 40 (2006).
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whole.” How a Justice envisions the Constitution as a whole matters,
making the politics surrounding nominations especially vexed.
Indeed, Ronald Dworkin claims that what was at stake in Robert
Bork’s failed nomination was his “jurisprudence—his vision of what
5
the rule of law requires . . . .”
Vision is the mechanism and metaphor through which attention is
focused on particular constitutional matters. A judge or Justice’s
organizing vision, which provides a narrative account of particular
provisions, and contributes to broader conversations of constitutional
6
culture, can dramatically shape how we live. For example, the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is generally not determined
7
by an interpretation of the clause’s text or an “interpretation” of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but rather by the way in which the Supreme
Court is willing to look at a problem arising under the Equal
Protection Clause. In an equal protection challenge, if government
action receives strict scrutiny it is less likely to be upheld than if it
8
receives rational basis review. Levels of scrutiny guide not only how
the Justices see the specific challenge before the Court, but also how
they see the challenge within a broader constitutional context. Thus,
the question in equal protection is not so much the difference
between originalism, textualism, or pragmatism as methods of
interpreting constitutional text, as it is a prior question of scrutiny.

4. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 8 (2005).
5. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 283 (1996).
6. Writing in particular about relations to past legal cultures, Bruce Ackerman
observes, “the way judges construct the American relationship to the deep past is not
a matter that any of us can take lightly: the things that they allow themselves to see
control, sometimes dramatically, what all of us can do in the here and now.” 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 38 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS].
7. “[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Despite Justice O’Connor’s desire “to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’” that old saw still has plenty of teeth. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (O’Connor, J.). “[B]etween
1990 and 2003, the Supreme Court only applied strict scrutiny 12 times, upholding
only a single law prior to 2002.” Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796
(2006); see, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (invalidating Georgia
redistricting plan as violating equal protection under strict scrutiny analysis); Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating
under strict scrutiny a city ordinance that prohibited animal sacrifice for ritualistic
purposes as an interference with free exercise of religion); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (invalidating city ordinance which gave
preference for construction contracts to minority-owned construction companies as
violating equal protection under strict scrutiny).
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Changed or competing visions drive substantive changes in the law;
moreover, in the context of constitutional law, “[t]he fight over the
9
Constitution is a fight over contrasting political visions . . . .” Think
here of the change in vision between the Lochner-era understanding
of constitutional culture, which foreclosed many attempts at national
legislation aimed at economic regulation, and the post-New Deal
approach, which permits not only certain forms of economic
regulation, but also allows for a national right to a minimum level of
10
social security. These are two very broad visions of the Constitution
that are largely incompatible. The transformation from one way of
seeing to the other occurred through the adoption of one vision of
11
constitutional structure and purpose over the other.
If this
observation concerning momentous constitutional change is right,
then constitutional meaning is not derived solely from text, or other
modalities of constitutional interpretation, but initially from more
comprehensive visions of the Constitution in context.
Supreme Court decisions are sprinkled with references to the
12
Framers’ “vision” of the Constitution and its institutions, the
13
majority’s (or dissent’s) “vision” of the law or an issue, and
9. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1090 (2001).
10. On the process of this transformation, see generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS].
11. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (concluding that
Congress’s attempt to prevent interstate commerce of child labor products was an
improper exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause), with Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (determining that Congress acted within its
Commerce Clause authority by limiting the acreage that farmers could dedicate to
wheat production). Note that such changes are never fully settled, but are open to
new interpretations. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my ‘revisionist’ view . . . the Federal Government’s
authority under the Commerce Clause . . . does not extend to the regulation of
wholly intra state, point-of-sale transactions.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause).
12. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995)
(“Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional
service would be inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a uniform National
Legislature representing the people of the United States.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because
he lives in the city or on the farm . . . . This is at the heart of Lincoln’s vision of
‘government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people.’”); H. P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (Jackson, J.) (“Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation
to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such
has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.”).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part) (“If Congress wished to amend the statute to enact the majority’s
vision of how the Guidelines should operate, it would be perfectly free to do so.”);
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It
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Congress’s “vision” in enacting a law. Moreover, the Court regularly
frames its own institutional capacity in terms of directing its vision or
turning a blind eye to a legal matter. Considering the scope of liberty
in matters of family life, for example, the Court states that it cannot
avoid concluding that the rights associated with the family are
fundamental “unless we close our eyes” to the reasons supporting
15
precedents. In closely divided federalism cases, the majority claims
that “[i]n putting forward a new theory of state sovereign immunity,
the dissent develops its own vision of the political system created by
16
the Framers . . . .” In each of these references to vision, something
more than a clause-bound interpretation of the Constitution is at
stake. To speak of a vision of the Constitution is to call attention to
how legal texts and their interpretations fit within broader legal and
cultural contexts that simultaneously shape and are shaped by further
interpretive articulations.
Indeed, the imagery of vision is often employed in internecine
comments between the majority and dissent. For example, the
17
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger accuses the majority of being “willfully
blind to the very real experience in California and elsewhere” of
18
attracting students without affirmative action programs. And the
19
dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D. accuses the plurality of turning “a
20
blind eye to the true nature” of the underlying statute. Thus, the
importance of vision in the law is underscored by the equal
importance of blindness in the law, which like vision, can be
selectively deployed to alter interpretive outcomes.
Scholars and critics also regularly frame problems with and
approaches to constitutional interpretation in terms of vision. Akhil
Amar frames his project in his comprehensive account of the Bill of
Rights in terms of vision: “[O]nly after we understand their world
and their original vision can we begin to assess, in a self-conscious
is not this Court’s constitutional function to choose between the competing visions of
what makes democracy work . . . .”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 472
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall for the “genius of the
Framers’ pragmatic vision”).
14. “Congress’ vision was that public broadcasting would be a forum for the
educational, cultural, and public affairs broadcasting which commercial stations had
been unable or unwilling to furnish. In order to further that vision, in 1967
Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 . . . .” FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 404 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
16. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 (1996).
17. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
18. Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
19. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
20. Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and systemic way, how much of this vision, if any, has survived—or
21
should
survive—subsequent
constitutional
developments.”
Elsewhere, Amar writes of the “geostrategic vision of union distilled
22
in the Preamble.” Bruce Ackerman argues for a particular way of
seeing the transition from the Lochner-era vision of the Constitution
23
to the “particular vision of social life elaborated by the New Deal.”
More generally, writing about the system of law articulated through
narrative, Robert Cover writes that “[a] nomos is a present world
constituted by a system of tension between reality and vision . . . [in
24
which] law gives a vision depth of field . . . .”
Vision creates the legal worlds we inhabit. Sometimes we view the
Constitution as a whole, articulating its meaning in terms of history,
structure and purpose. Sometimes we view the Constitution in its
component parts, focusing on the meaning of a particular provision
in relation to a particular problem. Through these ways of seeing the
Constitution, judges and scholars participate in the process of
creating constitutional meaning. But vision is also implicated in the
more mundane and ordinary ways in which we view social facts. How
courts see facts and the social contexts in which they arise have
substantive outcomes. There are of course subtle and meaningful
implications for failing to see important facts in the world that are
different than the implications for failing to see alternate meanings
of the Constitution, but these different implications are less
important than the similarities between the situations in which the
work of vision matters.
A persistent problem of constitutional interpretation is the
seeming indeterminacy of the text. Multiple meanings are almost
always possible. One promising way to resolve multiplicity is through
methodology. Under formalist approaches, we derive constitutional
meaning from interpretive method. According to critics, especially
legal realists and Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) scholars, formal
25
methodology alone is incapable of dispelling indeterminacy. Thus,

21. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 7-8.
22. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 106 (2005)
[hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION].
23. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 380.
24. Rober M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983)
[hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative].
25. Formalism is far from dead, however. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 18 (1998)
(“The text of the Constitution is about structure⎯about form.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989) [hereinafter
Scalia, The Rule of Law] (urging the avoidance of “totality of the circumstances tests”
and “balancing modes” in order to facilitate the rule of law rather than the rule of
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to the extent that indeterminacy is an ineliminable part of legal
practice, this Article argues that constitutional interpretation requires
an initial understanding of the role that vision plays in shaping our
interpretive debates. Part I examines the relationship between
interpretation and indeterminacy, and argues that vision focuses
critical attention on the ways that legal claims are seen (or not seen),
not solely as matters of reading or textual interpretation, but as
matters of concern to which attention may be drawn.
That vision is undeniably important to the law, is confirmed when
one considers the cultural importance of justice represented as the
ancient goddess Justitia—blindfolded, holding a balance and a sword.
Part II argues that the representation of Justice blinded suggests,
among other things, that the visual orientation of legal practice is
central to an understanding of the practice. When Justice is blinded
to some aspects of social reality, she is able to focus attention more
precisely on others. When it comes to rendering justice in the
constitutional context, examples of how blind Justice sees include use
26
of tiered scrutiny in equal protection doctrine, limitations on
considering structural harms such as those alleged in McCleskey v.
27
28
Kemp, and congressional control over federal court jurisdiction.
The figure of blind Justice also suggests that the practice of judging
is inseparable from ways of seeing. Judges, as well as Justices, are
supposed to follow rules and precedents already laid down. Rules,
however, are themselves indeterminate. If we are to avoid an
unconstrained and free-wheeling judiciary in light of this
indeterminacy, we must consider whether and to what extent judicial
vision should be constrained. Moreover, since the occasional new
way of seeing is inevitable, we must contemplate what guides the
process of change. To address these questions, Part III employs
insights from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to develop an
account of the practice of judging as a practice of articulating visions
of the law.
Once we better understand how the practice of judging depends
on vision, further questions arise concerning conflicts among and

judges); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 544 (1988) (“My goal is . . . to
rescue formalism from conceptual banishment.”).
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that all race-based classifications must receive strict scrutiny).
27. 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (holding statistical evidence indicating that black
defendants in Georgia received death penalty more frequently than white defendants
insufficient to establish discriminatory intent for purposes of Equal Protection
Clause).
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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transformations between competing visions.
Constitutional
interpretation seems particularly prone to transformational shifts.
How do we understand the transformation from one way of seeing to
another, especially when the change has far-reaching consequences
as in the New Deal abandonment of Lochner’s vision? Part IV
considers this problem, and again employs insights from Wittgenstein
to sketch an account of constitutional transformation. When
contending constitutional visions are at stake, we need more than
particular strategies for interpreting textual provisions; rather, we
need narrative articulations of how contending parties would have us
see the overall landscape of constitutional culture as well as the place
of particular practices within that landscape. If this Article is
successful, the effect will be to focus attention on the ways that
envisioning the Constitution situates the narrow, textually dominated
problems of indeterminacy and interpretation in legal practice.
I.

VISION, INTERPRETATION, AND INDETERMINACY

Law requires interpretation. The problem is that interpretation
requires texts, and texts have what H.L.A. Hart calls an “open
29
texture.” That open texture introduces indeterminacy, and in order
to constrain the effects of indeterminacy scholars and judges develop
methods of interpretation. Although interpretive techniques may
succeed in providing guidance to the interpreter as well as narrowing
the range of acceptable forms of interpretation, they never succeed
in creating a closed system with determinate meaning. Meaning
always escapes the confines of the method, and therefore
indeterminacy is never fully banished. This focus on the dichotomy,
or symbiotic relationship, between interpretation and indeterminacy,
however, hides another way in which legal text is given meaning:
through selection of matters as matters of concern.
Political, legal, and scholarly attestations to the fact that law is, or is
centrally determined by, interpretation leave little doubt of
30
interpretation’s importance.
For Ronald Dworkin, “[l]aw is an
interpretive concept,” and “[j]udges should decide what the law is by

29. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1961).
30. But see Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 709
(2005) (“Interpretation, while not foundational, is certainly essential . . . .”); Robin L.
West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 207 (1987) (arguing that adjudication is not an
interpretive act but an imperative one, designed to create commands which are
backed by the authority of the state).
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31

interpreting the practice of other judges deciding what the law is.”
For Owen Fiss, “[a]djudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the
process by which a judge comes to understand and express the
meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in
32
that text.”
More dramatically, for Robert Cover, “[l]egal
33
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.” We need
not quote Justice Scalia, who wears the interpretive badge on his
34
book’s cover: A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law.
Justice Scalia’s contribution highlights the degree to which the
question of interpretation is no longer whether law is defined in
terms of interpretive practices, but rather how best to go about the
35
practice of interpretation.
Because when it comes to the
36
Constitution, “[t]he document, of course, must be interpreted.” As
37
Thomas Grey asserts, “[w]e are all interpretivists . . . .”
Casebooks regularly divide constitutional interpretive methodology
38
between “originalists” and “non-originalists.” This way of presenting
interpretive methodologies suggests that James Ryan is not
exaggerating when he claims that “[f]or the last fifteen years or so,
Justice Antonin Scalia and his sympathizers within and outside the
academy have dominated discussion and debate over how best to
39
Originalists, like Justice Scalia, are
interpret the Constitution.”

31. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE].
32. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982).
33. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
34. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
35. Justice Scalia is not alone among Justices who have entered the debate over
how best to interpret the Constitution. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 5 (asserting
that courts must consider the democratic nature of the Constitution when
interpreting both statutory, as well as constitutional, texts); William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (1976) (arguing that
the concept of the “living Constitution” has given rise to the misguided notion that
the unelected judiciary should play a role in solving society’s problems).
36. Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26
(2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Document and the Doctrine].
37. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1984)
(noting further that “the real arguments are not over whether judges should stick to
interpreting, but over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they
should adopt”).
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818 (2d ed. 2005) (presenting
due process interpretation as divided between “originalists” and “non-originalists”).
39. James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1623 (2006). Not all originalists are alike,
however. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
123, 150 (2007) (using Paul Grice’s philosophy of language to conclude that “[t]he
meaning of the Constitution is best understood as the clause meaning of its
provisions”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV.
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primarily concerned with limiting the proper sphere of judicial
decision-making, while providing strict interpretive guidelines for
40
interpretation embedded in history and tradition. Everyone else
engaged in the interpretive enterprise, the “non-originalists,” are
likewise concerned with guiding judicial decision-making, although
they are far less concerned with formalist modes of constraining
41
discretion.
For example, Ronald Dworkin argues that because
abstract statements of principle constitute “the appropriate mode or
level of investigation into the original intention, then judges must
make substantive decisions of political morality not in place of
judgments made by the ‘Framers’ but rather in service of those
42
Of course, there are other ways of carving up the
judgments.”
constitutional interpretive landscape, for example, Amar’s distinction
between documentarians (those who focus on the document and its
history) and doctrinalists (those who focus on judicial doctrine
43
animating constitutional provisions), and those like David Strauss
who emphasize the common-law nature of constitutional decision44
45
making. More generally, narrative approaches to the law as well as
1599, 1629 (1989) (arguing that originalism has become indistinguishable from
nonoriginalism in that both “seek the truths that the Constitution conveys to us”).
40. See Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 25, at 1179 (advocating for the creation
of “clear, general principle[s] of decision”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (explaining
that originalism “establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually . . . separate
from the preferences of the judge himself”); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 351-52 (1990) (asserting that
“judges must always be guided by the original understanding of the Constitution’s
provisions”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 479, 486 (1996) (stating that the only reading of the Constitution that justifies
the preservation of a judicial role is one rooted in textualism and originalism); Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 548 (2003)
(discussing originalists’ commitment to using linguistic and legal principles to
uncover the meaning of the Constitution as understood by the founders). But see
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
238 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that the drafters of the Constitution did not
envision an interpretative strategy that resorts purely to the “intent of the framers”).
41. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
9-119 (1982) (describing six interpretive modalities); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67-74 (1997) (describing eight
different tests that the Court applies to implement the Constitution).
42. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 490 (1981).
43. Amar, Document and Doctrine, supra note 36, at 26-27.
44. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 879 (1996) (arguing that the common-law approach is the most effective
approach to constitutional adjudication because it reflects understandings that
evolve over time, and rejects the notion that law must come from a single
authoritative source).
45. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 24, at 5 (“[L]aw and narrative are
inseparably related.”). See generally LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 2 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (examining law as “stories,” rather
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the law and literature movement have focused attention on the
46
interpretive aspects of the law.
Each one of these interpretive approaches claiming how best to
interpret the Constitution specifically, as well as legal texts more
47
generally, presents a vision of what the law is or should be. Each
one also highlights particular institutional actors and problems and
leaves others mostly in the background. Originalists direct their
attention primarily to the federal judiciary, responding to the
“counter-majoritarian” difficulty with a profound distrust of the non48
elected third wheel of government. Trust is a major theme. Others
direct their attention to the ability of the law to embed, articulate,
and further fundamental shared public values through interpretation
49
of the law. Fundamental rights and values are central themes.
Each approach presents a competing vision that focuses on
different aspects of law and legal practice. Competing visions can
exist either at the level of “clause-bound” constitutional
than collections of rules and policies); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS 7 (1991) (employing a narrative form of legal analysis).
46. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW ix (1985) (arguing that reading law and literature share
similarities, and that “reading a legal text is often not so much reading for a single
meaning as reading for a range of possible meanings”).
47. Mark Tushnet argues that advocates of both “neutral principles,” such as
Herbert Wechsler, and advocates of “interpretivism,” such as John Hart Ely, attempt
to implement a similar vision of liberalism.
Interpretivism attempts to implement the rule of law by assuming that the
meanings of words and rules are stable over extended periods; neutral
principles does the same by assuming that we all know, because we all
participate in the same culture, what the words and rules used by judges
mean. In this way, interpretivism and neutral principles attempt to complete
the world view of liberalism by explaining how individuals may form a
society.
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 785 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down]; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 8-9 (1980); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(1959).
48. “But when the Court, without warrant in the Constitution, strikes down a
democratically produced statute, that act substitutes the will of a majority of nine
lawyers for the will of the people.” BORK, supra note 40, at 264. Alexander Bickel
provides the classic statement of the counter-majoritarian difficulty:
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the
action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it . . . it is the reason the charge can be made
that judicial review is undemocratic.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
49. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE ix (2003) (explaining that the
role of judges is to “measure practical reality against the values made authoritative by
the law and then seek ways to bring that reality into accord with these values”).
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interpretation, by focusing on the meaning of each clause in
isolation, or at the level of “grand vision,” by synthesizing a vision of
50
the Constitution as a whole. At either level, an argument about how
to interpret a unit of constitutional law is inevitably an argument
about how one should see that unit in context, in application, and in
relation to other units of law and aspects of life. In an important
respect, vision determines interpretation. What aspects of law one
focuses on, how closely one looks, and how clearly one sees those
aspects determines the manner in which an interpretive methodology
is deployed.
Moreover, at the level of constitutional theory more generally, how
one sees the relative roles and importance of values, such as
separation of powers, judicial review, legislative power, or executive
prerogative will drive interpretive methodology and outcomes. For
example, against more robust understandings of the role of the
51
Supreme Court and judicial review, Mark Tushnet and Larry
52
Kramer both argue for repudiating our current understanding of
53
judicial supremacy regarding constitutional interpretation. Kramer,
for example, advocates a version of popular constitutionalism in
which each branch of government has responsibility for interpreting
54
the Constitution. This approach preserves the power of “We the
People,” to say what the law is and avoids the prospect of our being
55
“ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians.” These different views on
the nature of judicial review inform both interpretive methodology
56
and ultimate outcomes on at least some constitutional issues. For

50. E.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 3-5; ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 420; AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note
22, at xi-xii; JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12-13 (2005) (uncovering an interpretive structure that
“emerges from the deepest democratic commitments of constitutional law”).
51. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194
(1999) (arguing that the people should “reclaim” the Constitution from the courts).
52. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004) (“The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in
the land on constitutional law. We are.”).
53. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1348 (2006) (“[J]udicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of
final decisionmaking in a free and democratic society.”). See generally JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10-17 (2001) (discussing the counter-majoritarian
aspects of judicial review).
54. KRAMER, supra note 52, at 247-48; Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 16-60 (2001).
55. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
56. Outcomes depend, for example, on how broadly a court exercises the power
of judicial review. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 53-69 (1996) (explaining how judicial minimalism affected the Court’s
decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
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57

example, Kramer argues that the view of judicial supremacy found
58
in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. —and
59
employed in cases like Cooper v. Aaron —makes possible the
60
outcomes produced in federalism cases such as United States v. Lopez
61
and New York v. United States.
Or take another example, differing positions regarding the role of
judicial review of executive action in national security and
international affairs will produce different interpretive outcomes in
particular cases. The Supreme Court’s willingness to assert judicial
power to review executive detention of persons designated “enemy
62
combatants” in cases such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and its willingness to
confront unilateral exercises of executive authority in creating
63
military commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, derives from broader
visions of the separation of powers as well as visions of the judicial
obligation to protect individual liberties.
With regard to the liberty protecting role, the Court has varied in
its own practice, deferring typically during times of crises, as the
Court did when upholding Japanese internment in Korematsu v.
64
United States, but asserting a stronger protective vision in other times
of national struggle, as the Court did when it struck down President
Truman’s wartime seizure of steel production in Youngstown Sheet &
65
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Indeed, in the latter case, the Court struggled to
articulate a method by which to review executive assertions of
inherent power under the Constitution, leading Justice Jackson to
comment in concurrence that “[j]ust what our forefathers did
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
66
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.” Given the
difficulty in determining how closely to scrutinize wartime or
emergency executive actions, some critics such as Judge Richard

TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix-xiv (1999) (advocating
narrow or minimal constitutional decisions).
57. KRAMER, supra note 52, at 219-26.
58. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
59. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
60. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
61. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
62. 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004)
(concluding that the federal habeas statute granted U.S. district courts jurisdiction to
hear claims of noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
63. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
64. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
65. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
66. Id. at 634.
AT A
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Posner, as well as Adrian Vermuele and Eric Posner, have argued
that judges should defer to such action. They argue that judges
cannot improve on the decisions the President makes in such
situations, and accordingly, there is no, or a very limited, role for
69
judicial review.
Essentially, in their view, judges lack the
institutional capacity in terms of knowledge and expertise to pass
judgment on issues related to national security, especially during
times of emergency.
By contrast, most other constitutional theorists, including David
70
71
Cole and Bruce Ackerman, each in different ways, argue for
vigorous judicial review of such unilateral executive action. Vermuele
and Posner’s position is not based upon constitutional interpretation,
but on their view of consequentialist policy judgments designed to
maximize overall social welfare, supplemented by a view of
constitutional structure that grants the executive sole authority to
72
respond to emergencies. Ackerman’s view could not differ more.
Ackerman’s proposed solution to emergency executive action—in
short, to provide a framework statute allowing a brief period
following an emergency event in which the executive can act
unilaterally, followed by a quick resumption of congressional and
judicial checks on that action—is one that views constitutional
structure as the guide and linchpin for solving potential
73
constitutional crises.
Ackerman’s view of structure, based on
constitutional history and tradition, as well as text, is one that
contemplates a role for all three branches of government, even
74
during emergencies. These opposing views of executive power and
67. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 158 (2006) (arguing that the law must adapt in times of
emergency).
68. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 275 (2007) (asserting that the law must not “shackle” the
government in situations of emergency).
69. See id. at 5 (contending that, during times of national emergency, the
executive branch’s speed and flexibility make it better suited to determine the
necessary trade-offs between liberty and security).
70. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 230-33 (2003) (discussing the need for
constitutional constraints to prevent government overreaction during times of crisis).
71. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM 101-21 (2006) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK].
72. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 68, at 17 (arguing that the proper scope
of judicial review during national emergencies is one that gives “high deference” to
executive actions).
73. See ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK, supra note 71, at 80-87 (claiming
that his proposed statute, the “Supermajoritarian Escalator,” will guarantee against
the indefinite extension of the emergency state).
74. See id. at 120 (explaining that both Congress and the judiciary play an
important oversight role over the executive during emergency situations).
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judicial review in relation to national security matters are not
determined by parsing the meaning of constitutional text alone.
Rather, how one views the relationships among specific constitutional
provisions with the document as a whole, as well as the structural
relationships the document creates, will also drive interpretive
75
While the materials may be “enigmatic” as Justice
outcomes.
Jackson suggests, equally important, and no less obscure at times, is
the way one sees the matter to be decided in all its cultural,
institutional, structural, and temporal complexities.
What these considerations of constitutional theory underscore is
the way in which prior visions of constitutional purpose, structure,
and text influence the framework within which specific acts of
interpretation occur. Decisions about broader constitutional theory
are often choices regarding the importance of democracy,
deliberative process, or institutional capacity that need not depend
themselves on the specific text under interpretation. Choice of
interpretive methodology itself seems unavoidably a matter of vision.
When considering limitations to its interpretive methodology, the
Court, through Chief Justice Hughes has stated:
It is no answer . . . to insist that what the provision of the
Constitution meant to the vision of [the framers’] day it must mean
to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the
Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is
intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
76
them, the statement carries its own refutation.

What is clear from this passage is a recognition that vision may
change over time while the object of interpretation—the
constitutional text—may stay the same. The self-refutation of the
“originalist” position identified by Chief Justice Hughes is not found
in a proposition about interpreting constitutional text, contra
77
advocates of that position such as Justice Scalia, but rather in the

75. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 67-98 (1969) (discussing the effect of structural considerations on judicial
review).
76. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
77. “[T]he originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the original meaning
of the text,” a view which Justice Scalia contrasts with “the philosophy which says that
the Constitution changes.” SCALIA, supra note 34, at 45. Justice Scalia misses Chief
Justice Hughes’ point: the “conditions and outlook” change with the time, not the
Constitution. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 290 U.S. at 443. Because “outlooks” are
unavoidably different in at least some respects over time, and since interpretation
depends on the available outlook, constitutional interpretation now will unavoidably
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impossibility of having the same vision as the framers. Because vision
unavoidably changes with different cultural, institutional, and
temporal settings, the way of seeing the constitutional text to be
interpreted changes as well. Thus, what gets selected as a matter of
concern, a matter of constitutional possibility, will alter with
transformations in vision.
For example, the growth of substantive due process as a means to
protect fundamental rights tracks a change in the way that the Court
sees its institutional role and sees the overall design and purpose of
the Constitution. Under substantive due process, the Constitution
not only expresses ideals of limited government and a private sphere
of liberty, but also requires that the Court place limitations on
government action to protect that liberty.
In choosing a
methodological approach, whether it be one of more limited review
in an attempt to recreate something akin to the framers’ vision, or
78
the rights-protecting view from Carolene Products, the Court adopts a
particular way of seeing the place, role, and importance of
fundamental rights which it then uses to interpret the Constitution.
Moreover, how the Court sees an issue of fundamental rights is
essential to the ultimate disposition of claims arising under those
rights. Perhaps no better illustration of this point exists than the
contrasting ways of assessing what was at issue in Georgia’s
79
prosecution of an individual under its anti-sodomy law. Writing for
the majority, Justice White viewed the relevant issue as “whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
80
to engage in sodomy . . . .” By contrast, Justice Blackmun in dissent
suggested that the issue was:
no more about “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy,” as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia
was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies . . . .
Rather, this case is about “the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men,” namely, “the right to be let
81
alone.”

be non-identical with constitutional interpretation then (during the founding
period) in at least some subset of cases.
78. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(contemplating that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”).
79. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (denying claim that Georgia
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy violates a fundamental right).
80. Id. at 190.
81. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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It is difficult to characterize this disagreement as a matter of
conflicting interpretations. Rather, the different ways of stating the
question in this case are possible because the majority and dissent
each have a different way of seeing what right is at stake, its place
within a larger social context, and the extent to which it should be
protected under the Constitution.
Even if we were to agree on a single interpretive methodology, a
problem nonetheless persists, whether it is articulated in terms of
vision or in terms of interpretation. This is the inescapable problem
82
of legal indeterminacy. Attempts to constrain judicial interpretation
of the Constitution must always confront textual provisions that
fundamentally resist complete determinacy. The lifeblood of legal
practice pulses on the expectation that something always escapes full
determination, leaving open space to make plausible interpretive
arguments in the future. Indeterminacy can be controlled in some
contexts, but no interpretive methodology can provide complete
control in all circumstances. The problem of indeterminacy gives rise
to proposals for more rigid methods of interpretation which in turn
give rise to further occasions for indeterminacy to develop. This
cycle has led some to embrace indeterminacy, not as a problem, but
as an opportunity.
Within the legal academic community, Critical Legal Studies
(“CLS”) scholars have made significant contributions to legal thought
by emphasizing the problem and consequences of legal
83
indeterminacy.
They argue that legal rules do not determine
adjudicative results and that legal analysis cannot determine whether
84
One source of indeterminacy,
a proposition of law is correct.
according to CLS scholars, is that propositions of law always contain
unstated ideological commitments that are themselves unstable and
85
indeterminate.
82. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875, 970 (2003) (advocating a flexible, “experimentalist” institutional approach
to legal indeterminacy).
83. See ROBERTO MANGEBEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 7
(1986) (critiquing indeterminacy in objectivism and formalism); Jeremy Paul, CLS
2001, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 701, 706-07 (2001) (discussing CLS’s use of
indeterminacy).
84. See Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
339, 341 (1996) [hereinafter Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis] (“Most
discussions of the indeterminacy thesis identify some common ground between its
proponents and its critics. Nearly everyone agrees that some legal propositions are
indeterminate.”).
85. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1213 (1985) (noting the contribution of changes in language to the instability of
legal concepts).
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Constitutional originalists, by contrast, have seized on the problem
of indeterminacy as well, though for very different reasons. For
them, indeterminacy raises the specter that judges will decide cases
86
on the basis of idiosyncratic personal preferences.
Thus, in
response to the possibility that unconstrained judges would
undermine the rule of law, indeterminacy becomes a reason to
provide a methodological means of limiting judicial discretion.
Indeterminacy also becomes an occasion to enshrine ideological
preferences under the guise of providing supposed neutral
87
methodologies of interpretation such as constitutional originalism.
Each response to the opportunity provided by indeterminacy
operates as the flip side of the same coin. Indeterminacy is the
currency of theories of interpretation.
Critical theories are not all negative, however, as some also claim
indeterminacy as an opportunity to reshape substantive law in
progressive ways. In general, for CLS scholars indeterminacy
provides an opportunity to re-imagine legal thought and the
88
possibilities for legal institutions. By demonstrating the hollow core
to claims of doctrinal determinacy in law, indeterminacy critique can
89
also provide the opportunity for renewed normative legal thought.

86. Cf. Nelson, supra note 40, at 524 (addressing the possibility of reconciling
originalism with individual judges’ understanding of legal principles).
87. An example of employing method to advance ideological preference is found
in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). To
avoid the expansion of constitutionally protected human rights under substantive
due process analysis, Justice Scalia argues we can only identify which fundamental
rights are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution by examining traditional practices. Id.
at 122 n.2. If the claimed human right has not been traditionally recognized and
protected, it cannot now be protected as “fundamental” under substantive due
process. Id. at 122. The ideologically contentious issue of identifying fundamental
human rights in the Constitution is “solved” by recourse to a supposed neutral
methodology of interpretation which looks to “original” traditions. See Scalia,
Originalism, supra note 40, at 862-63 (highlighting the additional problem of the
inability for people to agree on new meanings of text if originalism were cast aside).
Of course, one obvious problem with this “solution” is that what counts as “tradition”
is as susceptible to preferred ways of seeing as is the identification of fundamental
rights in the first place. Moreover, within anything we might identify as a tradition,
there will always be contested elements to that tradition, suppressed countertraditions, and indeterminacy in how the tradition is understood and articulated by
its practitioners. See generally J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1990) (discussing the countertradition problem).
88. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination, 59
MOD. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1996) (addressing “the idea of legal analysis as institutional
imagination” and promoting a “method” of analysis “free of the taint of institutional
fetishism and structure fetishism”).
89. Normative critique itself is not without its own problems of indeterminacy of
social context and legal interpretation. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 188 (1990) (observing that “normative legal thought is
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Take, for example, the argument by Joseph Singer, following Richard
90
Rorty, presenting what he calls an “edifying” theory of law. In this
account, the purpose of legal theory is not simply to unmask the
latent political and ideological roots of judicial decision-making, but
also to free us from what Rorty calls “outworn vocabularies” in which
our mistaken belief in the objectivity of existing doctrine ensnares
91
us.
Freed from the commitment to the “truth” of particular
doctrines and particular vocabularies, the critical theorist can see
92
“that a wider range of alternatives is available to us.”
Despite the furor over the indeterminacy of law, the rumors of
93
law’s demise have been premature. Recognition that law, like any
text more generally, is indeterminate has not brought about
94
wholesale nihilism in the legal profession.
Indeterminacy as a
source of radical legal critique is not new, but has been the object of
95
a venerable legal realist tradition. Because the political and social
contexts in which doctrinal indeterminacy might arise are themselves
not stable, new situations arise all the time that strain the formalist
claims to legal determinacy. Nonetheless, the issue of indeterminacy
has run like a counter-current in the flow of legal scholarship and
persists as a recurring theme in our critical understandings and
grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe
and regulate”).
90. See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1984) [hereinafter Singer, The Player and the Cards] (building on
Rorty’s ideas and rejecting notions of determinacy and rigidity in law).
91. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 373 (1979)
(suggesting that “edifying philosophy aims at continuing a conversation rather than
at discovering truth”).
92. Singer, The Player and the Cards, supra note 90, at 59.
93. See generally Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1986)
(“Law has been threatened by the disintegration of public values in the larger
society, and its future can only be assured by the reversal of those social processes.”).
94. If Stanley Fish’s point that theory has no consequences itself has application
anywhere, then it must apply to the minimal significance that the CLS emphasis on
the indeterminacy of law has had for the actual practice of law. See STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 315 (1989) (arguing against the idea that “the very point
of theory [is] to throw light on or reform or guide practice”).
95. Legal Realists, for example, took indeterminacy as an opportunity for
progressive interpretation. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935) (“A truly realistic theory of
judicial decisions must conceive every decision as something more than an
expression of individual personality, . . . that is to say, as a product of social
determinants and an index of social consequences. A judicial decision is a social
event.”). More generally, indeterminacy arises from the failed formalist aspirations
of legal practice. See JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1
(2d ed. 1986) (analyzing problems in legal practice with “legalism” as “the ethical
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following”); see also Robin
West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2003) (summarizing some of
the faults of the formalist perspective).
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practices of law.
This problem of indeterminacy has plagued
scholars as diverse as those with more traditional approaches, such as
97
Alexander Bickel, to those who might be called “postmodern,” such
98
as Jack Balkin. Moreover, postmodern thought more generally has
also focused on the failure of formalism, calling attention to the
99
contingent and de-centered nature of social life and meaning. The
postmodern critique, however, is not without problems and critics.
French theorist Bruno Latour observes that the postmodern
100
movement is a game of double gotcha. Inserting “law” for Latour’s
“facts,” the critic playing the game of gotcha must first show the
naïve believer in the determinacy of law that laws are really
indeterminate, a matter of political preferences, and that any
appearance of immutable principle is merely the successful
101
projection of particular preferences. For example, various forms of
legal realism purport to unmask what is really occurring behind
commitments to legal doctrine and principle, at least where theories
of adjudication are concerned. This unmasking has been so
96. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 19 (1997)
(noting indeterminacy plagues liberal projects, and arguing “that ideology influences
adjudication, by structuring legal discourse and through strategic choice in
interpretation”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1774 (1976) (identifying moral indeterminacy in private law).
But see Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 594 (1993) (arguing that adjudicatory indeterminacy does not
undermine liberalism).
See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1995) (arguing that “the ways in which jurisprudential concepts
and themes are interpreted and applied influence the manner in which ideas about
law come to be understood historically”); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal
Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 527 (2000) (noting the
widespread acceptance of the idea of legal indeterminacy).
97. BICKEL, supra note 48, at 16.
98. With regard to deconstruction, Jack Balkin observes that “[t]he difficulty was
not that ideology made law indeterminate but that it produced a brittle, oppressive
determinacy. The problem was not the rogue judge but the sincere judge. This
judge was always bound, not merely by doctrine but also by the limits of his or her
political and legal imagination.” Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 737 (2005); see Jack M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1985 (1992) (observing that “[p]ostmodern
legal culture is . . . a legal culture mimetic of postmodernity: fragmented,
decentered, diffused”); Jack M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
L.J. 743, 767 (1987) (explaining deconstructive practice as manipulation of
conceptual oppositions).
99. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE 16-17 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (eschewing
grand narratives of human knowledge for situated and local “language games”);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xv (1989) (sketching the figure
of the ironist, a “person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most
central beliefs and desires”).
100. Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to
Matters of Concern, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY 225, 237-39 (2004).
101. Id. at 237-38.
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pervasive in how law has come to be understood that the phrase “we
are all legal realists now” is a cliché scholars cannot restrain
102
themselves from repeating.
Having shown that law is really indeterminate and grounded in
preferences and naked assertions of power, the postmodern legal
critic has cleared the way for the second move in our game of
theoretical gotcha. The critic now argues that the indeterminacy has
definite shape after all, through hidden structures of economic
103
oppression or racial subordination.
What at first may seem like
unshaped indeterminacy is given form through the critic’s ability to
make visible the hidden structures that explain the real vehicles of
law. CLS and critical race theory sometimes purport to find
determinate social and political structures behind the superficial
indeterminacy of law; where politics would seem to be the free
expression of preferences, critique finds unconscious, structurally
104
hidden means of social organization.
With regard to indeterminacy, all these critical positions reject the
formalist vision of law as grounded in objective and rationally
determinate principles and at the same time argue that politics gives
a particular kind of hidden structure to law. Thus, the formalist
belief in the objective reality of rationally grounded legal principle is
shown to be the unwitting and naïve dupe to powerful political and
social forces that make law indeterminate. Moreover, the realist
belief in the interplay of social forces, private preferences, and
autonomous choices is shown to be the misguided acceptance of
105
visible transactions determined by hidden structures. Through this
102. See, e.g., Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical?
Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 690 (2003) (discussing legal
realism’s roots in classical American pragmatism); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997)
(noting that “as the cliché has it, . . . ‘we are all realists now’”); Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (“All major current schools
of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are
all legal realists now.”).
103. See Latour, supra note 100, at 238 (suggesting gender and class as additional
factors of control).
104. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 10 (noting that life is complicated, and
that “[l]aw too often seeks to avoid this truth by making up its own breed of
narrower, simpler, but hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths”); Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2005) (employing methods of social
cognition to demonstrate systemic racial bias at an unconscious level); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) (suggesting a way in which judges could recognize
unconscious racism).
105. Under the critical perspective,
[y]ou are always right! When naïve believers are clinging forcefully to their
objects, claiming that they are made to do things because of their gods, their
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unending game of gotcha, the critical seduction of indeterminacy as
a mode of critique unsettles unselfconscious doctrinal analysis, but
does not leave much reconstructive work for critics and legal
practitioners to do.
In our captivation by a recognition of indeterminacy, what Latour
suggests is missing is that we have lost a sense of what he calls
“matters of concern.” What I take him to mean by “matters of
concern” are the issues, “the gathering, the Thing” as he puts it,
106
which motivated critique in the first place.
I argue that what
motivates legal practitioners and theorists to be concerned on the
one hand by the failures of legal formalism, and on the other hand by
the excesses of indeterminacy critique, is that we share an interest in
law’s vision. We care about the capacity of law to see and to attend to
claims of justice, fairness, and due process, for example, in ways that
make perspicuous particular aspects of our social needs and shared
practices.
It may be that terms such as “justice” are all terms deeply
implicated in a particular version of liberalism, a key ideological
component of a broader way of seeing. Nonetheless, they serve as
placeholders for the kinds of commitments and institutional
arrangements needed to fulfill human hopes and desires and to
promote individual and collective human flourishing. As for making
available matters of concern, vision is analytically prior to
interpretation and the problems of indeterminacy. Judges must first
select a text to be interpreted, must be able to see a problem or issue
as relevant, and must be willing to attend to the implications of what
they see.
Within broader jurisprudential debates, the question of law’s vision
is not captured by the notion of “preinterpretation,” especially as it is

poetry, their cherished objects, you can turn all of those attachments into so
many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but
their own projection, that you, yes you alone, can see. But as soon as naïve
believers are thus inflated by some belief in their own importance, in their
own projective capacity, you strike them by a second uppercut and humiliate
them again, this time by showing that, whatever they think, their behavior is
entirely determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from
objective reality they don’t see, but that you, yes you, the never sleeping
critic, alone can see where that objective reality may be “economic
infrastructure, . . . social domination, race, class, and gender, [or even]
neurobiology [or] evolutionary psychobiology . . . .”
Latour, supra note 100, at 237, 239.
106. Latour, supra note 100, at 246. Though I would not go so far as to advocate
eschewing critique as Latour does, I do go along with the need to rearticulate the
role of criticism in everyday lives in ways that bring us closer, rather than draw us
further away, to others and to those things that are matters of concern for us.
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often mentioned in connection with constitutional interpretation
108
or in relation to Ronald Dworkin’s three stages of interpretation.
For Dworkin, in the “preinterpretive stage” the interpreter identifies
particular content to the rules and standards of a practice as a
109
tentative place to begin the process of constructive interpretation.
Dworkin analogizes this stage to identifying a particular novel as a
110
text to be interpreted.
In this respect, Dworkin articulates one
aspect of the way in which vision is both prior to interpretation and
111
But Dworkin’s preinterpretive
active in guiding interpretation.
stage does not question the mechanisms by which attention is drawn
to particular matters for interpretation in the first place; rather,
Dworkin’s project is one that articulates law as a practice of
constructive interpretation. Thus, his primary account begins at the
point when the object or practice has already been presented for
112
interpretation—with a vision of the law already in place.
Often the Supreme Court’s own commentary on its visual
inclinations reflects a self-conscious capacity to attend to particular
113
aspects of a legal problem. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the
reasonable-suspicion principle is not derived merely from wringing
meaning out of Fourth Amendment text, but by the Court’s
willingness to look for such meaning in social structure and cultural
context. In Terry, the Court comments: “we cannot blind ourselves to
114
the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves . . . .”
In a very different context—considering the constitutionality of
spousal notification requirements for abortions—the Court warns:
107. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory:
The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1772 (1997)
(“[C]onstitutional text matters because of the widespread contemporary acceptance
of the text as a necessary starting point for interpretation.”).
108. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 65-66.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 66 (using Moby Dick as an example).
111. Jules Coleman observes about Dworkin’s method: “The norms appropriate
to an interpretation of a practice depend on the kind of practice it is. This means
that in order to anchor an interpretation, we need some preinterpretive account of
the kind of practice we are interpreting and of its purpose or function.” JULES
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO
LEGAL THEORY 183 (2001).
112. In the end, Dworkin is interested in constructing an overall vision of what he
calls “law as integrity”:
We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and we accept the
adjudicative principle of integrity as sovereign over law, because we want to
treat ourselves as an association of principle, as a community governed by a
single and coherent vision of justice and fairness and procedural due process
in the right relation.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 404.
113. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
114. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).

CROCKER.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

24

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/5/2007 7:15:06 PM

[Vol. 57:1

“We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number
of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are
likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
115
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”
Even in its
116
notorious opinion in Lochner v. New York, the Court reflexively
employed its powers of vision: “It is impossible for us to shut our eyes
to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed under
what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting
the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other
117
motives.”
Moreover, the very idea of appellate judicial “review”
contains an ocular metaphor, one which Chief Justice Marshall
employed when establishing Supreme Court review of constitutional
questions: “Those, then, who controvert the principle that the
constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are
reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
118
eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.”
At issue here is more than a turn of phrase. No doubt, judicial use
of ocular metaphors stands in place of other concepts related to
understanding and recognition. The frequent use of such language
in judicial opinions, however, suggests that often what is at stake is
more than an expression of how a court understands a principle of
law. Frequently, at stake is not only a court’s ability to see legal
principles in a particular and relevant light, but also its willingness to
see particular features of social and institutional life. For example,
during a historic moment of jurisprudential transformation, the
Supreme Court, in considering the constitutionality of legislation
central to the New Deal, recognized that more than textual
interpretation was at stake. In refusing to rely on a more formalist
doctrinal approach to Congress’s commerce power, the Court noted,
“We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life
and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an
119
intellectual vacuum.”
A capacity to attend to particular aspects of legal argument and
particular features of social life does not exhaust the ways in which
vision is important to legal thought and practice.
Attention
implicates the persons who make their appearance before judges and

115. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (emphasis
added).
116. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
117. Id. at 64.
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1 Cranch) (1803).
119. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).
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magistrates. Vision as the practice of attending to matters of concern
can also be a matter of discourse and dialogue about those topics,
words, and concepts to which we give our consideration. Thus,
attention is made possible in its relation to linguistic articulation.
Although we may encounter others through the linguistic traces that
they leave, the degree to which we encounter embodied others in
public spaces is first a matter of directing our attention. Therefore,
the moment prior to the dialogic encounter is the moment of seeing,
the moment where another person is recognized and figured as a
subject of attention. So not only are seeing and attending matters of
120
embodiment, they are also matters involving language.
Consistent with the critique of indeterminacy as a primary problem
for legal practice, Richard Pildes provides a useful illustration of how
vision can dominate critical approaches to the law. Pildes sets out to
121
explain the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore as the product of the
“Court’s general vision of democratic politics and the role of
122
constitutional law.”
In many respects, the decision in Bush v. Gore
depended upon whether the justices saw a potential constitutional
crises or vibrant democratic contestation. Looking to California
123
Democratic Party v. Jones as philosophical background, Pildes suggests
that what animates the majority is a perspective that “sees a threat to
124
the stability of the democratic order.”
In contrast, the dissent
125
employs a “competing vision[] of what makes democracy work . . . .”
These competing visions impact judicial statements concerning
126
constitutional limitations on democratic processes.
Responses to these competing positions—one that fears the effects
of too much democratic participation, and the other that revels in
120. This thought is closely tied to Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the relation
between seeing and grammar:
You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You
interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical
phenomenon which you are observing . . . . But there is an objection to my
saying that you have made a “grammatical” movement. What you have
primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 121e, § 401 (G. E. M.
Anscombe trans., 1953). The ways in which we articulate through language matters
for our attention are interrelated to our ways of looking at those matters.
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 715 (2001).
123. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
124. Pildes, supra note 122, at 704.
125. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Compare Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997)
(holding constitutional a ban on “fusion” candidates), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992) (holding constitutional a statute prohibiting write-in ballots),
with Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional a prohibition against independents voting in party primaries).
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the warp and woof of democratic processes—determine substantive
outcomes more than any particular way of reading or understanding
constitutional text. Pildes writes, “it is something beyond law, or
facts, or narrow partisan politics in particular cases, that determine
127
outcomes . . . .” Through this critical approach to Bush v. Gore, we
see how considerations of judicial vision can be at least as important
as, and perhaps more important than, considerations of
interpretation and indeterminacy.
Ironically, if I am right that so much depends on what judges and
legal practitioners are willing and able to see, our primary cultural
icon of justice is blind. This iconic figure maintains vision through
other means: the primacy of judicial insight through carefully
constrained, even blindfolded, sight.
II. VISION AS BLIND JUSTICE
Consider the imposing image of Justitia—the Roman goddess of
justice. Justitia is frequently represented as blindfolded, holding
scales in one outstretched hand and a sword in the other. Of the
many historical images of justice, frequently as a goddess, and
sometimes as one of the cardinal virtues along with Prudence,
Temperance, and Fortitude, perhaps the most familiar
representation in American society is that of the blindfolded goddess
128
Justice.
On a little reflection, this familiar image is puzzling. Why is justice
blind and what could it mean to say that she who is blind can decide
what is just? What is the relation of weighing the content of paired
scales to claims of justice? Why paired scales hanging in the balance?
Who has placed the blindfold on justice? What then would be the
relation between the possibility for just insight and just sight? What is
the relation for judicial practice between seeing and being blinded?
Can we so easily translate between the tactile experience of feeling
the world, and the visual experience of seeing the world? However
we might answer these questions, it seems clear that Justitia
represents the perhaps unattainable ideal that “[i]t is a constituent
part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with judicial eyes,
and knows nothing respecting any particular case, of which he is not
129
informed judicially.”
127. Pildes, supra note 122, at 714.
128. For more discussion of the multiple images and meanings in the
representation of justice, see Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96
YALE L.J. 1727, 1729-33 (1986).
129. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 (7 Pet.) (1833).
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Judicial eyes see with a different light. One response to the ideal of
judicial blindness is to say that justice must blindly balance the scales
because justice must not take cognizance of any personal attachment
to claimant or content. If blinded, there will be no bias, no
prejudice, no predisposition to see one claimant or the content of
one claim in a better light than the other. If the judge can see the
difference, then the judge might be inclined to view the claims in a
light more favorable to one of the claimants. The act of blindness
operates as a kind of self-restraint that makes its appearance as a
rational response to the potential for judicial bias. Bias could only be
a product of knowledge, suggesting a tension between the full
cognition that comes with sight and the ability to render proper
130
justice.
Thus, on this account, what blind justice sees is always
partial and incomplete.
Another response to the ideal of blindness is to focus, not
specifically on bias, but on fairness. Justice is blind and employs
scales to ensure procedural fairness, an ideal fundamental to the
Constitution’s due process tradition. Procedure constrains judicial
sight and provides criteria of relevance for what kinds of things
Justitia might properly see. Like the mechanics of paired scales,
procedure provides the mechanics for fair outcomes through the
blind weighing of competing claims. Indeed, the very process of
balancing the scales of justice is a tactile procedure. Justice does not
need ocular vision when she can simply feel the pull of one scale
against another.
131
This “pull” might be what Robert Cover means by indirection.
Cover considers the disability of blindness as enabling the attainment
of fully conscious insight precisely because the route to direct
132
knowledge of what is behind the “veil” has been foreclosed.
He
describes another pull of justice blinded, however, in that “the
strongest temptation . . . is the temptation to see—to overcome the
133
elusiveness of indirection. Procedure is the blindfold of Justice.”
On this view, procedure produces fairness by constraining the sight
of Justice and champions insight over sight.

130. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 128, at 1764 (“A blindfolded Justice . . . may
suggest the problematic relationship between judgment and knowledge . . . .”).
131. See Robert M. Cover, Unpublished Manuscript, in ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M.
FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1231, 1231 (1988) (“Justicia in our tale has put on
the blindfold to avoid the pitfalls of fear or favor; she has rendered it necessary to
produce by indirection.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1232.
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There is more than a mere play on words in the difference between
insight and sight, for there is a deep sense in which the former is
parasitic on the latter. Blinded, however, Justice need only feel the
pull of the scales in balance. Fairness, then, comes from a kind of
positional objectivity—the blind perspective of justice relies
completely on the relative position of the balanced scales, a
134
positional disposition for which sight is presumed unnecessary.
Justice depends on position, and position constrains the possibility of
judgment and vision. To see with judicial eyes is to see from within a
position situated in social, cultural and institutional settings.
A. Social Structure and Vision
Thomas Kearns and Austin Sarat write, “Justice, it seems, is a denial
of sight though not of seeing, a regulation of information though not
of knowing, a restriction on what is permissibly attended to though
135
not a deficit in attention.”
Our image of justice is one that
expresses the possibility of blindness, the prospect of a lapse in
attention, to certain kinds of claims—those not easily amenable to
being weighed in the balance.
One example of this kind of positionally objective judicial
blindness is found in the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v.
136
Kemp. There, the Supreme Court refused to take a careful look at
evidence of systemic bias in the prosecution and sentencing of
137
criminal defendants. At trial, McCleskey introduced evidence from
138
the Baldus study of the dispositions of Georgia murder cases
showing that black defendants in particular were more likely to
receive capital sentencing than white defendants, and that when
white persons were victims, black defendants were more likely to
139
receive a capital sentence than when black persons were victims.

134. For an interesting development of the idea of positionally dependent
observations, see Amartya Sen, Positional Objectivity, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 126, 127-28
(1993).
135. Thomas R. Kearns & Austin Sarat, Legal Justice and Injustice: Toward a Situated
Perspective, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 1, 7 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
136. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
137. Id. at 290-91.
138. The study was conducted by Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and
George Woodworth. Id. at 286.
139. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 328-45 (1997)
(discussing the Baldus study and its implications).
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Nevertheless the Court took the view that the statistical evidence of
140
Since McCleskey could
systemic bias, even if true, was irrelevant.
not show individual intent by the prosecutor, nor even generalized
intent of the Georgia legislature, to discriminate against him on the
basis of race, the Court was unwilling to consider his equal protection
claim. This decision is a form of purposeful judicial blindness to
certain features of the world—namely, the problem of structural
141
racial subordination. The objection follows swiftly to ask how is one
to “see” structural subordination? It is nowhere visible in particular
items in the world that one could pick out.
Indeed, defenders of McCleskey would point out that it is a matter of
institutional competency that judges cannot see beyond the
particular claims and the particular individuals appearing before
them in dispute. McCleskey rests, however, on the view that claims are
discretely packaged as separate from the patterns of conduct in which
142
they arise.
We remove the actors to the dispute from their
institutional and social settings, and then examine their relations in
the rarified air of court procedure.
But persons who make claims before blind Justice appear as
individuals who bring with them their own contexts, histories, and
structural settings. So when McCleskey shows evidence that what it is,
what it means, to be black like him in Georgia, that evidence can
never be particularized towards him specifically in the way that the
court imagines. Yet, the fact that it cannot be so particularized does
not mean that it cannot be seen; rather it means that a choice is being
made not to look at the way his claim emerges only by making visible
its place within a pattern of conduct constituting his concrete social
reality. Indeed, Randall Kennedy, employing visual metaphors,
argues that “[p]aralyzed by fear that seeing would entail doing, the

140. See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 441
(1988) (declaring, “[t]he Court’s response to the detailed evidence set forth in
support of Mr. McCleskey’s claim . . . was a labored ‘So what?’”).
141. Courts regularly reject statistical race-based discrimination claims. For
example, despite providing statistical evidence of racial discrimination in Charleston
County, South Carolina’s application of the death sentence for black defendants,
Earl Matthews’ habeas petition was denied, and he was executed. Matthews v. Evatt,
105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1997); see John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1771, 1781 (1998) (discussing Matthews as an example of the misapplication of
McCleskey by lower courts).
142. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance
of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433,
473-74 (1995) (arguing McCleskey is a “disgraceful decision” because, while
“acknowledging the risk of racial prejudice influencing the capital sentencing
decision,” the Court concluded that the risk was not “constitutionally unacceptable”).
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Justices inflicted upon themselves a myopia reminiscent of the one
143
that afflicted the Court during the reign of Plessy v. Ferguson.”
This kind of blindness is not unique to the capital sentencing
context. In the Court’s equal protection cases, for example, there is
variation in both the scrutiny given equal protection claims according
to whether the Court sees the relevance of background social
structures to equality. The Court’s performance in this regard has
not been entirely consistent, as we see the Court lurch from one
context to another, acknowledging in some situations the relevance
of social structure for equality. Differences in this regard are partially
144
explained by the Court’s using a method of “tiered scrutiny” review.
Tiered scrutiny, however, is just another way of naming the process by
which the Court attends to particular aspects of some claims and not
others. What matters is whether the Court is willing to look.
For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court was willing to
view claims based on structural and statistical discrimination against
145
blacks in employment contexts.
But in Washington v. Davis, the
Court refused to see the claim of “racially differential impacts” under
the Fourteenth Amendment in the administration of an employment
146
test. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court was willing to look at the structural
impacts from refusing education to the children of illegal
147
immigrants.
But then in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, the Court refused to see a judicial role for intervening in
situations of gross inequality of school funding across school districts,
148
claiming that there is no fundamental right to education. In Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court was able to see
the structural discrimination in the assignment of school children to

143. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1415-16 (1988). Kennedy further notes that
by defining recognizable rights on the basis of practical concerns over remedies,
“leads the Justices to obscure⎯for themselves and society as a whole⎯the reality they
purportedly address.” Id. at 1415.
144. See generally G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1
(2005) (exploring the Supreme Court’s historical use of various levels of scrutiny
when adjudicating alleged constitutional violations).
145. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (banning the use of employment requirements that
have a racially discriminatory effect even without proof of discriminatory intent).
146. 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976) (holding racially neutral qualifying test does not
violate equal protection based on disparate impact). But see Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005) (upholding disparate impact claim under Title VII).
147. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that denying a public education to
children based on immigration status violates equal protection).
148. 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (holding that because education is not a fundamental
right, unequal educational funding does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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149

neighborhood schools.
But in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court was
unable to look at the wider problem of inter-district suburban
discrimination against urban minorities as warranting judicial
150
cognizance of a constitutional harm. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court
was able to see the impact of legislative and judicial state action in
151
enforcing racial covenants. But in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the
Court was unable to look at the role of state action in granting one of
its limited numbers of liquor licenses to a private club that practiced
152
racial discrimination.
I am, of course, glossing over the doctrinal differences in these
cases. But my point is not one of doctrinal analysis. What we
discover, rather, through cases like these is that the Court’s shifting
vision drives substantive outcomes. When the Court is willing to look
at the structural situation and see the structural harm, then it
intervenes and attempts a remedy. Yet, if it is not willing to look
closely at the claims of structural subordination of African Americans
in school and employment contexts, for example, then the Court will
not see a justification for adopting a remedial role in the particular
domain. Although the texts of the decisions in these cases are
presented as interpretations and applications of the Equal Protection
Clause, what drives the judicial doctrine here is less the product of
interpretation and more a product of the scope of the Court’s vision in
applying the constitutional doctrine. Willingness to attend to
particular features of social structure and reality, however, is itself
connected to views about the purpose of equal protection doctrine
and the judicial role in enforcing equality norms. At stake is how the
Court envisions the reach of constitutional norms into more deeply
embedded social structures. When available, clear evidence of
discriminatory intent makes for easy equal protection cases.

149. 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1970) (upholding the district court’s determination that
allowing all Charlotte metropolitan area students to attend the school closest to their
homes would perpetuate past segregationist policies); see also Keyes v. Denver Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973) (requiring a school district to present a realistic
plan for desegregation); Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 444 (1968)
(holding that a so-called “freedom of choice” plan allowing students to choose which
school to attend insufficient to eliminate discrimination).
150. 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974) (holding that courts cannot impose inter-district
desegregation remedy unless districts were deliberately drawn to create segregated
systems).
151. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding that state courts cannot enforce private
restrictive covenants which exclude persons of a particular race from living in a
particular area).
152. 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (concluding that a state’s award of a liquor license
to a club that practiced racial discrimination was not state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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Otherwise, the Court has usually been reluctant to look too deeply or
too closely at more embedded and hidden violations of equality.
Attending to equality requires careful recognition of remedial
limitations. Questions of remedy meld with questions of institutional
adequacy as one route by which all courts constrain their sight. Even
if a court is able to take judicial notice of the existence of harm to a
particular person in virtue of that person’s situation within a
structural pattern, there may be little it can, or even should, do. This
observation leads to the claim that such patterns that harm the
particular person are best addressed by the legislative branch. It
bears only a brief reminder that for all the efforts at school busing
and court ordered remedial measures in the wake of Brown v. Board of
153
Education, by many accounts today’s schools are as segregated as
154
ever in many places.
When the structural harm, and the institutional remedy, involves
land use and patterns of residential development, the results have not
been encouraging either. After years of litigation attempting to
achieve more racially and economically integrated housing in
suburbs in New York and New Jersey, little change in housing
155
156
patterns has resulted.
Both of the Mount Laurel Township cases
157
and the United States v. Yonkers Board of Education case involve courts
taking a broad judicial vision of structural harms and structural
remedies, refusing to remain blind by leaving the issue to the

153. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
154. See generally James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999)
(citing statistics indicating that the desegregation of black students, which increased
continuously from the 1950s to the late 1980s, has now receded to the lowest levels in
three decades). Although the South remains the nation’s most integrated region for
both blacks and whites, it is the region that is most rapidly going backwards as the
courts terminate many major and successful desegregation orders. See ERICA
FRANKENBURG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, A Multiracial
Society with Segregated Schools:
Are We Losing the Dream? (2003),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg03/
AreWLosingtheDream.pdf (last visited July 31, 2007) (noting that data from a survey
of over 1,000 K-12 teachers indicates that teachers are teaching pupils largely of their
own race, “adding a new dimension to school segregation”).
155. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA (2003).
156. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 724-25
(N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (holding that a township’s zoning
ordinance that allowed only single family dwellings on large tracts of land and which
had the effect of keeping low-income individuals from living in the township, was
unconstitutional); see also S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456
A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983) (affirming the principle of the first Mt. Laurel case and
exclaiming that a “strong judicial hand” is necessary to fulfill the obligation to
provide for a realistic opportunity for housing).
157. 518 F. Supp. 191, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the government’s claim
involving housing patterns and school segregation were claims upon which relief
could be granted under the Fair Housing Act).
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legislature. Again, the point is not to wade into the doctrinal
intricacies of these cases, but to note that it is not a matter of textual
interpretation or indeterminacy in the law that initially drives the
possibilities here. Rather, what drives the court, the recognition of
harm and the willingness to attempt a remedy, is the scope and
intensity of judicial vision.
B. Scrutiny, Principle, and Vision
Textual interpretation is, of course, involved in many of these
cases. How the Court construes the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is a factor in how the Court
responds to structural claims. In determining the meaning of
equality, the familiar problem is that the clause provides no selfexecuting rule for how to determine whether any person has been
158
denied “the equal protection of the laws.” Government may classify
persons on the basis of age, disability, gender or race, for example, in
legitimate ways that would not violate a constitutional principle of
equal protection. To determine when those classifications are
legitimate, the Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered approach
to how much scrutiny it will give to a given equal protection
159
challenge. In determining, for example, whether a “suspect class” is
involved in a challenge, which would trigger “strict scrutiny,”
requiring that a classification be “necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest,” or a non-suspect class, which would trigger
only “rational basis review,” requiring that a classification be
“rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest,” what is at
160
stake is how pervasive and probing a court’s vision will be.
Thus, the first interpretive task the Court confronts in an equal
protection challenge is the task of determining how closely and how
161
broadly it will look at the harm alleged.
How intensely the Court
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985)
(establishing that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect class, meaning that
statutory classifications need only have a rational basis to pass constitutional muster);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1976) (employing intermediate scrutiny to
equal protection claim based on sex discrimination). On the need for such rules of
mediation, see generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decisional Rules, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2004).
160. The Court also employs “intermediate scrutiny” when a semi-suspect class,
such as gender, is used. Under “intermediate scrutiny” the Court requires that a
classification be substantially related to an important governmental interest, and
requires the state show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for differential
treatment. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996).
161. Tiered scrutiny is not without its detractors on the Court as exemplified by
Justice Stevens’s repeated criticism of this method. See Parents Involved in Cmty.

CROCKER.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

34

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/5/2007 7:15:06 PM

[Vol. 57:1

looks, the way in which it focuses its vision, determines substantive
outcomes. A classification strictly scrutinized leads the Court to look
exceedingly closely, and with utmost care, almost inevitably leading to
162
a conclusion that the classification is unconstitutional, whereas
163
quite the opposite usually follows from rational basis review.
After determining how to focus a court’s vision, the second
interpretive task of a court is to choose—even if only implicitly—a
principle by which to provide equal protection of the laws. Owen Fiss
has cast the central interpretive debate as one involving a choice of
principles by which the Equal Protection Clause should be
164
interpreted.
One candidate is the “anti-discrimination” or “anticlassification principle.” Its primary inquiry is determining which
165
classifications of persons (e.g., race or sex) are suspect.
Such
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2798 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s misuse of the three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis
merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause in the
Constitution.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“What is clear is that it is not the unavailability of judicially manageable standards
that drives today’s decision. It is, instead, a failure of judicial will to condemn even
the most blatant violations of a state legislature’s fundamental duty to govern
impartially.”); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I have never
been persuaded that these so-called ‘standards’ adequately explain the decisional
process.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one
Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not
direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases.”); see also Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified:
Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2340 (2006) (discussing Justice Stevens’s approach to equal
protection interpretation).
162. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (concluding the
University of Michigan’s race-conscious admissions policy satisfies strict scrutiny
because it took several individualized factors, including race, into account).
163. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-36 (1996) (holding a state
constitutional amendment did not satisfy rational basis review because the only
credible motive for the amendment was animus toward homosexuals and bisexuals).
164. See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
107, 127 (1976) (arguing that equal protection proscribes legally entrenched
socioeconomic castes under a “group-disadvantaging principle” or “antisubjugation”
principle). See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advocating an anti-subordination principle
in which laws and classifications that perpetuate subordination of particular groups
are highly suspect, even when they are facially neutral); Rogers M. Smith, Equal
Protection Remedies: The Errors of Liberal Ways and Means, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 185 (1993)
(endorsing a principle similar to Cass Sunstein’s “anti-caste principle”); Cass
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994) (arguing for a
harmonization of both equality and liberty through an “anti-caste principle” against
ingraining socioeconomic differences into systemic social disadvantages).
165. See generally Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the
Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Brest, In Defense of
the Anti-Discrimination Principle] (defining the “antidiscrimination principle” as a
model in which preferences are granted to traditionally disadvantaged minorities to
rectify past discrimination); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (exploring whether and to what extent
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suspect classifications raise a presumption that their use—by favoring
or subordinating one class over another—violates equality. The focus
of this principle is on neutrality—any use is suspect no matter the
166
motive or purpose in employing the classification. In Washington v.
Davis, for example, the Court did not care that the remedial purpose
167
was to redress the effects of past discrimination. What mattered was
only the present use of the classification. This approach eschews
appeal to one of the historical purposes of enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment—viz., the elimination of the effects of slavery.
Another interpretive principle to animate equal protection
doctrine, one that Owen Fiss has championed for years, is the anti168
subordination principle.
This principle begins with a healthy nod
to the historical purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and sees its
role as eliminating the use of race and other classifications where
their use achieves or furthers the creation and maintenance of a
169
subordinated class of persons.
The goal of equal protection is to
170
embody an ethical view against caste. If the effects of a practice are
that racial subordination is furthered, then the practice violates the
Equal Protection Clause—no matter the presence or absence of
171
invidious motive. But if the effects of a practice employing a racial
classification are to remedy historical injustices and to provide for
future equality, then the anti-subordination purpose of the practice is
172
sufficient to meet the requirements of equal protection.

the political branches’ motives are when making classifications tending to lead to
discriminatory results).
166. Requiring a specific showing of discriminatory intent has been a high bar to a
plaintiff challenging a discriminatory practice. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (holding that employer’s hiring preference for
former veterans did not show discriminatory intent even though it resulted in far
fewer women getting hired); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Hous. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that racially discriminatory intent is necessary to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
252 (1976) (holding a racially neutral employment test is constitutional despite a
disproportionately adverse effect on African-American job applicants). See generally
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 937
(1989).
167. 426 U.S. at 247-48.
168. See Owen Fiss, Another Equality (Social Groups and the Equal Protection Clause), 2
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3 (2004) (expanding on the anti-subordination
principle and arguing that the Court should focus on socio-economically
disadvantaged groups).
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 11.
172. See id. at 7 (arguing that antisubordination principle would uphold
affirmative action policies while antidiscrimination principle would not).
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is a case that employs this kind of
173
174
interpretation. Hills v. Gautreax is another exemplary case where
this principle is used to counteract the devastating effects of
ghettoization—a form of racial subordination—on black residents of
175
housing developments on the south side of Chicago. Though even
now Fiss would see the anti-subordination principle underlying some
of the Court’s approaches to equal protection, it seems fair to say that
with its opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court
squarely came down on the side of the supposed neutrality of anti176
discrimination.
One mechanism by which the Court manages its own judicial vision
is by maintaining a so-called “neutrality” test. Judicial doctrine, as it
has developed in the Fourteenth Amendment context, requires that a
court refuse to look beyond the purported facial neutrality of a
practice, and thus makes invisible much that would otherwise be
177
visible as forms of structural racial or sexual subordination. Indeed,
the Civil Rights injunction to create a “colorblind” society relying
heavily on the Fourteenth Amendment has undergone a
metamorphosis into a strict scrutiny test that views any use of “racial
classifications” as suspect—no matter the remedial purpose—in the
name of “colorblindness.”
The question the Court resolved in Adarand was whether supposed
“benign” racial conscious remedial programs are subject to the
178
Court’s “strict scrutiny” analysis.
The answer was yes. Justice
O’Connor relied on her earlier statement that “the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of
179
a highly suspect tool.” With this opinion, we have an intersection of
three different optical metaphors—colorblindness, “smoking out”

173. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
174. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
175. See id. at 296-97 (determining that HUD’s funding of racially discriminatory
housing policies by the Chicago Housing Authority necessitated granting
appropriate relief); see also OWEN FISS, A WAY OUT IX-X (2003) (arguing that innercity ghettos are systems of social subordination stemming from governmental
policies).
176. 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995).
177. There are ample examples of discretionary blindness in the Equal Protection
context. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 257 (1978)
(refusing to see the systemic gender bias in state hiring practices that give preference
to veterans).
178. 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995); see Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 50001 (1989) (holding that “generalized assertions” of past racial discrimination do not
justify racial quotas when awarding public contracts).
179. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
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(e.g., making it appear, making it visible from where it was hidden),
and scrutiny (looking from close proximity perhaps, or at least paying
particular attention).
Although Adarand raises a number of questions to be critically
pursued, it is not this essay’s purpose to engage in doctrinal analysis
of strict scrutiny, or the Fourteenth Amendment, or even the suspect
181
overruling of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. What is central to our
purpose here is how the Court makes explicit that what is at stake in
these cases is not how to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment—not
a debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment is properly
understood according to anti-classification or anti-subordination
principles, though these are no doubt implicated—but how the Court
will see claims of racial discrimination. In holding that “all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
182
strict scrutiny,” the Court holds that it will only look in the most
exacting way at the differences that exist between purposes and
practices employing racial classifications. It will look to see whether
or not the classification serves a compelling state interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.
In determining to look closely, ironically, the Court maintains a
considerable amount of blindness. That is, it determines not to look
and see structural subordination and attempted remedies in a
favorable light unless the harm is so clearly visible, and the remedy so
clearly connected, that even the “legally blind” can see. On remand
in Adarand, even by looking through the narrow scope of strict
scrutiny, Judge Carlos Lucero is able to see the compelling interest,
and see that it is sufficiently tailored to achieve the purpose of
remedying harms caused by racial and sexual subordination in the
granting of government contracts, though it was certainly no small
183
visual task.
Current judicial practice is that of selective blindness in
adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment claims involving racial
classifications, and that practice is (perhaps) guided by the

180. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997).
181. 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990) (holding that the FCC’s minority preference
policies were constitutional because they advanced legitimate congressional
objectives).
182. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
183. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding Federal program designed to promote hiring of “socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals” meets strict scrutiny), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001),
dismissed as improvidently granted, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
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“antidiscrimination principle.”
Even after the Court’s recent
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, which affirmed the diversity rationale
Justice Powell first enunciated in University of California v. Bakke,
judicial reasoning still relies on the antidiscrimination principle that
185
all racial classifications are suspect. As we have seen, employing this
principle requires a certain amount of purposeful blindness, for it
refuses to examine and to differentiate classifications designed to
accomplish invidious purposes (e.g., racial subordination) from
classifications designed to accomplish remedial goals (e.g.,
affirmative action).
This view takes its lead from Justice Harlan’s statement in dissent in
Plessy, that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
186
tolerates classes among citizens.”
In her dissent in the other
Michigan affirmative action case, Gratz, Justice Ginsburg argues that
when a racial classification “denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes
187
a burden,” then “[i]n that sense, the Constitution is color blind.”
Justice Ginsburg continues, however, to note that “the Constitution is
color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
188
undo the effects of past discrimination.”
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the majority is unpersuaded by this color conscious reasoning. The justification for
this willful blindness, as provided by dissents in Grutter and elsewhere,
might be glossed as follows: not only has the use of race in the past
produced invidious results, but its continuing use in the future is
highly suspect because of the risk of stigmatization of blacks, the risk
of discrimination against whites, and the general harm to society due
to inconsistent classification principles; we would be better served to
treat all cases equally (treat likes alike) so that no racial classifications
189
are thus allowed.
184. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204, 236 (reasoning that classifications based on
race are harmful to society as a whole, no matter the motivations behind them);
Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 165, at 21 (citing an array
of cases that uphold the constitutional principle of “color-blindness” and arguing
that benign racial classifications should be suspect but not necessarily subjected to
strict scrutiny).
185. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1976)).
186. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“What the Equal Protection
Clause forbids, but the Court today allows, is the use of [merit-based] standards handin-hand with racial discrimination”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 (locating the injury
itself in the classification, not its effects or the presence of invidious purpose); see also
SCHUCK, supra note 155, at 175-77 (criticizing the continued use of racial
classifications in law to remedy past use of those same classifications because the very
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This way of thinking has reached its zenith in the Court’s most
190
The
recent school case involving the use of racial classification.
school districts in both Seattle and Louisville employed racial
classifications in making some decisions to assign some students to a
191
particular school.
One purpose of using race can be described as
an attempt to maintain racial diversity among the students in each
school. Employing strict scrutiny, the Court per Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that such “benign” use of racial classifications is
192
unconstitutional.
Rejecting entirely the beneficial goals of using
race in the school context, Chief Justice Roberts concludes:
“Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary
conception of race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents
193
and our Nation’s history of using race in public schools.” The new
constitutional vision is one that is blind to any differences noted by
Justice Ginsburg in dissent in Gratz, and Justice Breyer in dissent in
the Seattle school case, between invidious uses of race and beneficial
194
uses.
The irony in this position, as Justice Stevens notes in dissent in the
Seattle school case, is that it calls to mind another kind of blindness.
It calls to mind Anatole France’s statement that “the majestic equality
of the law forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
195
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”
Justice Breyer, writing for four dissenters, highlights the
fundamental difference between using “race-conscious criteria to
achieve positive race-related goals,” and using race-conscious criteria

existence of such “benign” classifications often weakens elements of the group they
aim to serve). But see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44
STAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (“To argue that one did not really consider the race of an
African-American is to concede that there was an identification of Blackness.”)
(emphasis in original).
190. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would
justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout
American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that “[a]t
the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual
or national class.”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757
(2007) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
191. Id. at 2746.
192. Id. at 2764-65.
193. Id. at 2760.
194. Justice Thomas, writing in concurrence, claims that he is “quite comfortable”
with “the notion of a color-blind Constitution.” Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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designed to stigmatize and subordinate. Justice Breyer relies on an
anti-subordination theory of equal protection, arguing that the
positive use of race-conscious criteria in the school context
197
authorized by Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, “is predicated upon a
well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment. That view
understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal
Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial
198
exclusion.”
For Breyer, context matters, and under our
Constitution, one cannot simply refuse to look at differences between
the use of race to subordinate and the use of race to build-up by
claiming to be colorblind. Vision matters, and how we employ our
vision will determine what we see under our Constitution.
Despite the now much-discussed problem of defining groups and
their membership criteria for purposes of such programs as
affirmative action, social structures were quite effective in producing
systemic racial subordination. And that effectiveness was greatly
199
enhanced by the purposeful blindness of the Plessy court. It is thus
not entirely clear that the willful blindness of procedural constraint
embodied in the notion of “colorblindness,” is so much the
indirection of judicial insight through legal procedure as it is the
200
misdirection of the judicial gaze.
To recapitulate, the issue as I have framed it is not one primarily of
201
interpretation.
It is not primarily a matter of the relations among
text, meaning and reader. Rather, the central issue is the way in
which the Court employs relative states of vision—a visual
employment that points to institutional practices and institutional
roles—to attend to some matters but not others.

196. Id. at 2811-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
197. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
198. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2814.
199. The words providing the blindfold bear repeating here:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
200. This point is especially relevant when we consider Reva Siegel’s compelling
argument that structures of subordination undergo what she calls “preservationthrough-transformation” with the change of legal rules. Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
201. Of course, “framing” is itself a visual metaphor too, and complicates relations
of inside and outside, raising questions about the nature of margins. JACQUES
DERRIDA, Tympan, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY ix-xxix (Alan Bass trans., 1982) (1972).

CROCKER.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2007]

ENVISIONING THE CONSTITUTION

10/5/2007 7:15:06 PM

41

There is, however, a lurking issue of the way in which the
willingness to look is tied to a more comprehensive theory. As we
have seen, judicial vision is guided in the equal protection context
particularly by an initial decision to employ mediated scrutiny, as well
as a decision over what principle to recognize in order to animate the
equal protection imperative. In this context, however, further
unstated “theories” also play a guiding role. In equal protection cases
different uses of the concepts “persons” and “individuals” in the
Court’s analysis of equal protection are grounded in deeper
assumptions of liberal political theory.
202
In Shelley v. Kramer the Court employed a particular abstraction
that “[t]he rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
203
rights established are personal rights.”
Justice Scalia takes up this
abstraction of the “individual” in his concurrence in Adarand to claim
“[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That
concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the
204
individual . . . .”
And in her majority opinion in Adarand, Justice
O’Connor underscored the point that the Constitution “protect[s]
205
persons, not groups.” She then contrasts the idea of equal protection
as a personal right with the idea that group classifications “have long
[been] recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
206
prohibited.’” In Parents Involved in Community Schools V. Seattle School
207
District No. 1, Chief Justice Roberts takes up the refrain that the
Equal Protection Clause protects persons, not groups, adding that
208
this principle derives from Brown itself. The principle entails that
there is no constitutional toehold for claims of equal protection on
behalf of identity groups or claims made in virtue of a person’s group
identity.
The talk of individuals in abstraction is guided by a particular
political and philosophical theory. To talk about persons as if their
situations and contexts can be stripped away is to be guided by a

202. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
203. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
204. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
205. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (O’Connor, J.).
206. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)) (upholding
a curfew applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry).
207. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
208. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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broadly liberal political theory that does not give priority to the
communal aspects of social life over the liberty interests of the
209
individual abstracted from the community. That theory claims that
selves are somehow prior to their “classifications”—prior to their
commitments and situations as embedded in social practices and in
210
relation to other persons.
The guiding function of this theory
focuses the Court’s sight in such a way that they are unable to look
and see the differences that protecting persons in virtue of their
group membership might make. There is no problem in being
guided by philosophical theories of this nature, and indeed, at some
level such guidance may be unavoidable. What such theory does,
however, is guide ways of seeing such that some matters become
matters of concern for the Court, and other matters are of a kind
211
invisible to the Court’s attention.
Groups are invisible to equal
protection under the Roberts Court’s approach. Because the Roberts
Court is also colorblind, the future of equal protection law will have
to develop under a more narrowly constrained constitutional vision.
C. Blinding Justice
There are other ways that Justitia may be blinded other than
blindfolding herself. Among the friezes that adorn the facades of the
Yale Law School buildings, one such frieze, on the north side,
features Justice and her paired scales. But rather than being
blindfolded, Justice’s eyes are being poked by a court jester, a fool.
This is no doubt a humorous take on the idea of justice blinded—for
here, Justice is indeed being blinded by someone else, and by a fool
212
no less.
Though playing the fool allows for alternate meanings as
209. The father of modern liberal theory is of course JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859).
210. E.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Critics of strong
individualism include 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). For an effective defense of the priority of the individual over society, see
WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1991).
211. I find Iris Young’s emphasis on asking “whom we are discussing when we
compare people’s situation with regard to any or all . . . targets of equality,” a good
example of thinking in terms of the group rather than the individual. Iris Marion
Young, Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 1
(2001). She argues that “Structural inequality . . . consists in the relative constraints
some people encounter in their freedom and material well-being as the cumulative
effect of the possibilities of their social positions, as compared with others who in
their social positions have more options or easier access to benefits.” Id. at 15; see
AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 1-8 (2003) (discussing role of identity groups
within a democratic society).
212. The fool’s blinding of justice itself has a history. For example, Albrecht
Dürer illustrates Justitia being blindfolded by a fool for Sebastian Brandt’s Ship of
Fools (1494). Curtis & Resnik, supra note 128, at 1740.
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well. What Justice is able to see depends on others, and when those
others choose to blind Justice to particular claims of justice, the result
may be a fool’s jape.
Here the issue is institutional capacity and, for federal courts,
institutional dependency on congressional control. The kind of
control over federal court jurisdiction that Congress exercises leads
to much stronger control over what Justitia may see than state courts
face. Moreover, what a court is allowed to see depends on other
forms of restraint, such as constitutional rules of justiciability.
Notions such as concreteness and causation as requirements for
standing have the effect of constraining the kinds of claims to which
213
Justitia may attend.
As should be clear by now, Justitia’s vision is constrained or blinded
in many ways. For example, many rules exist to constrain the
evidence a jury, as surrogate for Justitia, may consider. This form of
selective blindness sometimes produces strange consequences. For
214
example, under California v. Brown, a jury can be instructed during
penalty phase of a trial not to be swayed by sympathy or sentiment for
the defendant, but during the same trial scene, under Payne v.
215
Tennessee, a jury may be swayed by the same emotions on behalf of
the victim’s family. The message to Justice: do not have emotionally
colored sight in one case, but it is okay to see with emotion in
another. The issue here is not the inconsistency with which the
surrogates for Justice are able to see or are blinded, but the very fact
of the selectivity of sight. See this evidence, but not that. See with
216
impassioned eyes here, but not there.
With regard to the federal courts, Congress may play a similar role
when exercising its power over jurisdiction.
Although many
examples abound of Congress’s exercise of its power over federal
jurisdiction, a couple of quick examples should suffice to illustrate
the ways in which an external body such as Congress can blind
217
Justice. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) may be one example of blinding Justice as a consequence
213. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 765 (1984) (denying standing to
plaintiffs seeking IRS denial of tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated
on the basis of race).
214. 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
215. 501 U.S. 808, 826-27 (1991) (holding that choosing to permit the admission
of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument erects no per se bar).
216. For discussion of the role of emotion in law, see generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
HIDING FROM HUMANITY: SHAME, DISGUST AND THE LAW 5-12 (2004); MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 53-78 (1995)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE].
217. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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of motivations that may have little to do with criminal justice
considerations, and more to do with pursuing a vision of state
218
AEDPA has the
sovereignty and limiting federal judicial power.
219
effect of limiting the habeas claims a federal court may review,
effectively eliminating many habeas petitions at the district court
level, and even more, by narrowly restraining the limitation period
during which a habeas petition may be filed, effectively reducing the
220
number of claims any federal court hears.
Leaving aside any
substantive criticism of AEDPA, the point is simply to call attention to
the ways in which Congress is a central actor in constraining Justitia’s
vision by removing or altering federal court jurisdiction.
Another example of how the issue over the Court’s vision leads to
blindness is the battle between Congress and the courts over
221
determinate sentencing.
In an attempt to minimize sentencing
disparity in different jurisdictions, determinate sentencing is
designed to unify the factors to be considered when sentencing and
218. A project that the Supreme Court has been a partner in furthering. See, e.g.,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that States retain immunity from
suits in their own courts beyond congressional power under Article I); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (protecting state’s sovereign immunity
from suit as a limit on congressional power).
219. A petitioner must first obtain a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) from
either the district court or the appellate court before an appeal from the denial of
habeas relief will be heard. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006). In order to receive a COA, a
claimant must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
Id. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (holding that a
judge must find it at least debatable whether the petition for habeas corpus states a
proper denial of a constitutional right).
220. The Roberts Court has taken an active approach to narrowing its habeas
jurisdiction by holding that federal appeals filing deadlines are jurisdictional. Bowles
v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (overruling Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry
Meat Packers, Inc., 303 F.2d 609, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1962) and Thompson v. INS, 375
U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam) to the degree they purport to authorize exceptions to
the jurisdictional rule).
221. Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the task of developing
determinate Sentencing Guidelines, which were to be binding on judges. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1) (2006). See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(legitimizing the power of Congress to delegate guidelines to the courts under the
separation of powers doctrine). The Supreme Court established a constitutional
basis for discretionary sentencing through a series of cases focusing on the Sixth
Amendment implications of judicial fact-finding. Under this new jurisprudence,
sentencing guidelines will continue to serve an important advisory role. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250-59 (2005) (holding Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are not mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004)
(holding that the judge may only impose a penalty greater than the maximum
penalty based on a finding of fact by the jury or fact admitted by the defendant
under the Sixth Amendment); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (finding
that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is violated when a sitting judge
determines the presence of aggravating factors required for imposition of a death
sentence); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any
penalty increased beyond a statutory minimum must be submitted to a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
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the weight those factors may be given. The goal is to provide a more
uniform way in which courts attend to sentencing of criminal
defendants.
More than eliminating disparity, however, this project has spilled
over into broader objectives seeking to constrain judicial vision to
pre-determined factors to which a judge may look when imposing
222
sentence.
The result was a controversial constrained judicial
position. In holding that a sentence nonetheless imposed within a
properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable, the Court per Justice Breyer has confirmed the
importance that those guidelines play in providing uniformity and
223
Whatever the ultimate merits of
constraint in federal sentencing.
such efforts, which as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in
224
United States v. Booker have been in flux, we can see that federal
courts are not merely blinded by their position in employing the
metaphoric judicial balance; rather, their vision is also directed by
other institutional actors.
Legislative jurisdiction stripping is a further way other institutional
bodies direct judicial attention. For example, recent congressional
legislation establishing military commissions include provisions
stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over claims brought under
225
habeas corpus for detainees designated as “enemy combatants.”
This effort is perhaps most significant for its larger separation-ofpowers issues involving judicial review of unilateral executive actions.
Here again, Congress is exercising power over judicial vision through
its power to control federal court jurisdiction. If this control over
federal jurisdiction is deemed valid, federal courts will not be able to

222. Perhaps the most flagrant example is the Feeney Amendment to the Protect
Act, which narrowed judicial discretion to depart downward from guideline sentence
ranges, changed the standard of appellate review of sentencing departures from
abuse of discretion to de novo, and temporally prohibited the Sentencing
Commission from promulgating new downward departure grounds. Protect Act,
Pub. L. No. 10821, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 245
(granting sentencing discretion back to the federal courts and nullifying the Feeney
Amendment).
223. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (2007) (holding that a
presumption that a lower court sentence is reasonable does not violate the Sixth
Amendment).
224. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
225. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2636 (2006) (precluding any court, justice, or judge from hearing a habeas
petition filed by or on behalf of an alien designated as an enemy combatant). The
Supreme Court is set to review during its October 2007 Term whether Congress
validly stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by foreign
citizens detained indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. Boumediene v. Bush (061195) and Al Odah v. U.S. (06-1196).
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attend to claims that the executive has acted unconstitutionally in
226
Congress
holding detainees indefinitely without charges or trial.
has adopted a particular view of the proper distribution of judicial
oversight over executive action, thereby constraining the power of
judicial review.
If, as it seems to be the case, some form of blindness or visual
constraint is an ineliminable part of judicial practice, then the
guiding theory by which judicial vision is directed in practice should
be among our most important critical concerns. Though, we might
do well in thinking about the ideal of judicial blindness, to heed
carefully Judge Cardozo’s advice: “Metaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end
227
often by enslaving it.”
On the one hand, such blindness can be a product of
professionalization and institutional necessity. No wise Solomon or
Dworkinian Hercules sits able to discern the ultimate resolution in
justice, and hence judges are constrained by the norms of their
profession, lest the arbitrariness of King Rex rule. Procedural
blindness assures a particular kind of fidelity to law itself—one that
depends on the rule of law and something like Lon Fuller’s elements
228
of “morality that makes law possible.”
Here the problem to be faced is not one of constraining particular
judicial decisions, but in properly focusing the courts on the matters
to which they are institutionally best able to attend. Altering federal
court jurisdiction is one way of directing judicial sight. Other ways
depend on a much more broadly encompassing political debate over
the role of courts in a democratic society. We can approach the
institutional constraint by also focusing on the values to which we
most want judges to adhere. For example, commitments to values
such as integrity and consistency play a role in decisions over how
much sight judges should have and what matters to which they
229
should attend.
On the other hand, the choice among states of vision or relative
blindness is a purposeful judicial choice. Judges are human too, and
hence they have positionally dependent perspectives on the world.
What they are able to see is frequently a function of what they are
226. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006) (using statutory
construction to avoid a potentially unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus
under the Detainee Treatment Act).
227. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
228. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1969).
229. See generally DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 31 (valuing integrity as central
to a judge’s role).
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230

willing and able to look and see.
And what they are willing to look
and see is further dependent on other background conditions that
include, the broader constitutional culture, and even more broadly,
231
what Wittgenstein calls forms of life. Constitutional culture can be
understood to encompass the broader set of legal actors in society,
including persons and citizens whose lives are shaped through the
232
law.
This culture can give rise to expectations concerning
institutional behavior and judicial review in a number of contexts.
For example, in requiring administrative agencies to provide
reasoned explanations for their decisions and to give adequate
consideration to all arguments by concerned parties, components of
the “hard look” doctrine, courts have adopted a level of scrutiny
233
designed to ensure reasoned decisions by agencies. Actions by one
institutional actor are thereby constrained by the exercise of a
particular visual stance by another.
The place for critical intervention here is thus not on the
discretionary function of judicial interpretation on which so much
critical attention is focused. A different set of questions focus on the
role of judicial practice. Do judges see their role as protecting
minority rights, for instance, or are they motivated by the appearance
230. For example, a panel of the Tenth Circuit was not willing in Alexander v.
Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), to hear the claims of victims and survivors
of the 1921 massacre of black residents of the Greenwood neighborhood of Tulsa,
Oklahoma. See id. at 1211-14 (giving background of the massacre and ensuing legal
battle). The panel opinion claims not to be able to look past the prudential need to
let unredressed claims lie because of a statute of limitations. See id. at 1219-20
(stating that while exceptional circumstances may justify a tolling of the statute of
limitations, the circumstances have sufficiently dissipated requiring enforcement of
the statute of limitations). The dissent on denial of rehearing en banc would have
required the court to look closely at the merits of the claims, rather than have the
eyes of justice shut one more time to the victims of the massacre of over two hundred
blacks by white Tulsans aided by state actors. See id. at 1159 (Lucero, J., dissenting)
(believing that the case “compellingly” presents a “question of exceptional
importance” for a rehearing en banc). For an important history of the riot, see
generally SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921
(1982).
231. I do not intend for this claim merely to repeat the concerns of legal
realism—viz., to ask either what idiosyncratic facts motivate judicial decision-making
or what sociological and institutional considerations constrain judges. Brian Leiter,
Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 375 (1997).
Although, at the level of the individual judge acting as a person, the judge’s own way
of seeing plays a role, too, in shaping the landscape of legal vision.
232. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (identifying
constitutional culture as a specific subset of culture that encompasses extrajudicial
beliefs about the Constitution).
233. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983) (reviewing regulatory decision by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and requiring more evidence to support the
decision disregarding the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts).
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234

of neutrality? Do judges see abstracted individuals or particularized
persons? Is it better to have more process to ensure fairness in
criminal justice or do criminal investigation and prosecution issues
weigh more heavily? Are they motivated to see the law from the
broadest level of generality—to be Dworkin’s Hercules—or are they
motivated by a concern to pay attention to the particular claims in
concrete settings despite having no view of the whole of law? In
answering these and other questions, different rank orderings of
fundamental values—the kind frequently cited as needing to be
balanced, such as liberty values and security values⎯will produce
235
different views of the issues a court sees.
III. JUDGING AS A WAY OF SEEING
The blindness trope on the one hand calls attention to the self—
and other—imposed constraints on Justice by making visible
particular matters as matters of concern and by making visible
particular aspects of selected matters of concern. There is, however,
a tendency in legal theory to concentrate critical inquiry on the
moment when a judge decides a case—a moment that occurs after
claims, issues and particular aspects have been made visible.
Although Justitia stands for more than the judicial decision,
representing most generally the virtue of justice itself, the fact that
representations of “Justice” blindfolded with paired scales frequently
adorn court buildings indicates the strong public identification of
justice with judicial decision.
Within academic circles, the debate over a theory of law, since the
publication of H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, has largely been
236
concerned with the issue of the relation between law and morality.
But within this debate, a substantial amount of effort has been
expended in approaching that issue by way of a theory of
adjudication. Such theories, then, are able to connect with broader
concerns in legal theory that have been appropriated by way of “legal
schools.” Legal schools, largely in the “legal realist” tradition, such as
Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory, are concerned very
234. Roberto Gargarella, Group Rights, Judicial Review, and “Personal Motives,” ISSUES
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY art. 3
(2002), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art3/.
235. See generally Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002)
(discussing the Court’s special institutional role in protecting liberty while balancing
legitimate security interests).
236. HART, supra note 29, at vii; see COLEMAN, supra note 111, at 1 (defending a
version of inclusive legal positivism).
IN
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much with issues of access to, the process of, and the resolution of
claims of justice. And so, in an important way, a major preoccupation
of legal theory, although at times by indirect approach, has been with
judicial decision-making. Bringing the use of judicial vision and
blindness to the forefront provides insight into evaluating theories of
adjudication.
Dworkin focuses his theory of just adjudication on judicial sight.
His is a totalizing approach. His too is a turn to interpretation. The
Herculean judge must, in fulfilling the requirements of integrity, seek
to provide the best possible interpretation, and render the best
237
possible decision in each case consistent with the whole of law.
Employing imagery also developed by Thomas Nagle’s conception of
238
a “view from nowhere,” the Herculean judge works outward from
the specific question presented by way of concentric circles to ever
wider spheres of judicial vision in order to provide the best decision
239
in the case. Hercules is far sighted and broad minded. Hercules is
not concerned with the particularities of any individual case in itself,
but views each claim of justice as part of a larger web of law to which
240
he owes his fidelity.
Dworkin asserts: “Law as integrity, then,
requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great
network of political structures and decisions of his community by
asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the
241
network as a whole.”
Interpretation for Dworkin’s judge is never
local and particular, but always global and general.
Robin West, by contrast, writes of a need for the “particularizing
gaze” of a sympathetic and caring judge, and that “Judges have a
special obligation to the particular litigants before them, just as
242
parents have a special obligation to their children.”
The problem
with the image of justice blindfolded, or justice that seeks to follow a

237. Dworkin writes:
Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible,
that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about
justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them
to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that
each person’s situation is fair and just according to the same
standards.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 243.
238. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 5 (1986) (“We may think of
reality as a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually
from the contingencies of the self.”).
239. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 250 (“His judgments of fit
expand out from the immediate case before him in a series of concentric circles.”).
240. Id. at 244.
241. Id. at 245.
242. Robin West, Justice and Care, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 40 (1996).
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“plumb line,” or even justice as integrity is that in each case these
theories of justice neglect the interpersonal, the compassionate, the
nurturing impulse. West describes justice without care as “selfrighteous smugness,” and care without justice leads to “animalistic
243
partiality.” Rather than the image of totalizing justice in Dworkin’s
Hercules, West provides an image of tempered particularity—a way of
seeing the particular claimants, not blinded by the aspirations of
244
larger institutional and social concerns.
Dworkin’s totalizing model of adjudication and West’s
particularizing model of adjudication represent two different
extremes on a continuum. Though, to be fair, they are certainly
unequal extremes. Far more discursive weight falls on Dworkin’s end
of the spectrum, which is joined by a plethora of similar theories
attempting to make sense of at least a limited historical whole. These
are the approaches Roberto Unger calls “[r]ationalizing legal
analysis,” which he describes as “a way of representing extended
pieces of law as expressions, albeit flawed expressions, of connected
245
sets of policies and principles.”
Dworkin’s model of Herculean
constructive interpretation is certainly one version of rationalizing
legal analysis.
So too, however, is the pedagogically dominant Langdellian
model—viz., the casebook method which is meant to reveal a set of
246
(imperfectly) connected legal policies and principles.
West’s call
for re-imagining justice as a particularized project requiring the kind
of caring gaze modeled, not on blind justice, but on a kind of
nurturance that the model of motherhood presents, stands in sharp
247
contrast to these rationalizing analytic tendencies.
Particularly as
West’s call is directed towards judicial decision-making as a
particularized activity, it avoids the institutional fetishizing of the
248
rational reconstructions of law Unger seeks to subvert.
Indeed,
West’s call for greater emphasis on care and the particular needs of
claimants is consistent with Unger’s claim that we need a method of
adjudication “that respects the human reality and the practical needs
243. See id. at 36 (describing the relationship between care and justice).
244. See Robin West, Feminist Justice, at Home and Abroad: Re-Imagining Justice, 14
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 333 (“Justice—and more particularly legal justice—is a
badly under-theorized topic in jurisprudence . . . .”).
245. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 36
(1996).
246. See generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 170-74 (1993) (describing
Langdellian formalism); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1
(1983) (discussing the development of Langdell’s orthodox legal paradigm).
247. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1988).
248. UNGER, supra note 245, at 7.
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of the people who come into court without harnessing them to a
249
glittering scheme for the improvement of the law.”
More generally, the model of legal analysis that both Unger and
West wish to overcome can be called the “model of rules.” The basic
requirement that judicial decision-making be based on following
some version of a delineated rule might occupy the largest part of the
generic middle-ground between the approaches of Dworkin and
West. The model of rules invokes the idea that each decision is
compelled by the weight of prior decisions, guided by institutional
and principled commitments to values such as integrity, consistency,
publicity, protected expectations and the like. Rules are rails on this
model, the judge need only look directly behind and directly in
250
front.
There is no need to scan the horizon perpendicular to the
rails (as Hercules might have to do), because in any domain of law,
the question of particular justice has already been determined by the
generalized rule of law to be applied. This formalist version of the
model of rules leads to the conclusion at the end of a judicial
decision that there was no discretion, only an obligation to provide
the answer already compelled by the rule.
Even with a healthy dose of skepticism about strict adherence to
formalist precepts, the model of rules still dominates much legal
imagination. One can take the Dworkinian approach and prefer
251
principles over rules and still largely follow the “model of rules” by
thinking that whatever else may guide a judge, she needs a rule, a
standard, or a principle to serve as a determinative guide. This guide
is modeled on a rule, even if in the end, it provides a greater degree
252
of discretion (e.g., a principle) than does the ideal formalist model.
This much, at least, might also be central to the very idea of
precedent—viz., that we owe a debt of fidelity to the past just as the

249. Id. at 113.
250. I take this image of rules as rails from Martin Stone, Focusing the Law: What
Legal Interpretation is Not, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 4449 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
251. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967)
(criticizing the positivist reliance on rules rather than principles).
252. To be clear, I am not denying that there is a distinction between a rule and a
principle. I am merely pointing out the structural and methodological similarity
between models of legal analysis that need some form of guide. And generally, there
is a frequent added sense of mourning and loss. In recognizing the role of principle,
there is a sense of loss of something rigid (like a rail) and complete that will compel
a unique response to any inquiry. (Law and legal theory’s “sustaining loss” is a topic
for another essay, however).
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future must hold faith to our present with past, present and future all
253
mutually bound by the model of rules.
The model of rules is not without serious problems, even apart
from its lack of institutional imagination as Unger urges. The very
notion that such rules can operate as rails to guide and constrain
judicial decision making is highly problematic. We have already
examined the game of “gotcha” that seems to plague postmodern
thought. So when faced with indeterminacy in rule following, we can
either adopt a position that requires us to accept some form of
deeply-embedded skepticism with regard to judicial decision-making,
or, we could avoid that skepticism, while retaining the model of rules,
by using social science research to explain what is really going on—
viz., rules are being followed, but not simply the ones to which
judicial decisions self-consciously follow.
In contrast to both of these approaches, Wittgenstein’s famous
comments on rule-following provide a way of clarifying why the
model of rules is inadequate, while showing the way to a “solution” to
the supposed problem of indeterminacy that would follow from
254
skepticism about the model of rules.
Framing this issue as one of
instruction, Wittgenstein asks how we teach a student to continue a
series by adding two each time (e.g., 92, 94, 96 . . .). We might first,
for example, go through each member of the set from two to ninetyeight with the pupil. There is a pedagogical limit, however. We can
only show the student how the series goes so far, and thereafter the
student must continue it on her own. What do we say when the child
counts by adding two correctly until she reaches 100 whereupon she
continues the series with 104, 108, 112? We will want to say that this
is certainly wrong—that the child has failed to understand the rule.
But the child can retort that she was merely following the rule to add
two until 100 and add four thereafter, and hence was following that
rule perfectly well. The lesson we learn by extrapolating from this
simple example is that for any way of continuing the series there is
some articulable rule that purportedly can guide one’s response.
The indeterminacy that seems built into the very idea of following
a rule is disconcerting to any theory that depends on the determinacy
253. Take, for example, Kronman’s sense of precedent of “mutual indebtedness”
and obligations between past and present where “[w]e are indebted to those who
came before us, for it is through their efforts that the world of culture we inhabit
now exists . . . [and] they are indebted to us, for it is only through our efforts that
their achievements can be saved from ruin.” Anthony Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1067 (1990).
254. See generally WITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed., 1992)
(laying out the general theories surrounding Wittgenstein’s view of rule-following).
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of rules. Saul Kripke, for example, notoriously explicates this “rule
255
The question
following paradox” in terms of the function of “+.”
for Kripke is to ask how, despite the countless times we have
performed the function “+” in the past, is one to respond when
confronted by the next instantiation of “plus.” The skeptical problem
is that any deviation from the standard usage, say the “quus” function,
could be made to accord with some rule. If no rule can determine its
future use, and all ways of continuing the series could be the product
of following some rule that covers both the initial situation as well as
the deviation, then it would appear that we must be skeptical both
about rule-following as well as our capacity at instruction. In the
adjudicatory arena, if every decision could be made to accord with
some rule of law, some precedent, then the very idea of following
precedent would seem to be undermined. The mantra to “treat likes
alike” would serve as no determinative guide at all, because to say
“now go on to continue the series like this” would resolve little about
how one is to proceed. It may be that we must simply make a
decision, one not already determined by what has gone before.
It would appear that with no ability to determine an action by a
rule, one cannot be accused of failing to follow a rule. Thus, the very
idea of following a rule loses all force of determination. Wittgenstein
states the problem in the following way:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by
a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord
with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to
accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with
256
it. And so there would be neither accord or conflict here.

But Wittgenstein does not leave us in a paradox. Notice that
Wittgenstein’s critique leads to skepticism only if we accept the rails
as our model of instruction. The formalist calls for determinacy, and
when none is found, the postmodern theorist is tempted to declare
that all is possible. The formalist is at a dead-end, calling for what
cannot be had.
But so too, even Unger admits, is the Critical theorist, whose
critique “tempts the radical indeterminist into an intellectual and
political desert, and abandons him there alone, disoriented,
257
disarmed, and, at last, corrupted–by powerlessness.”
Note,
however, that the formalist and the Critical theorist represent two
different scenes in the same play. The former wants something she
255. SAUL KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 7 (1982).
256. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 81e, § 201.
257. UNGER, supra note 245, at 121.
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cannot have, and the latter mourns the loss of what could have been.
Both accept that legal analysis begins with one’s relation to the model
of rules.
By contrast, Wittgenstein shows us that we are led necessarily to
skepticism only if we accept the premise that determinacy is only to
258
If we abandon the model in
be found from the model of rules.
both its positive and negative scenes in the play of legal theory, then
we need not be abandoned in a desert of our own making, but are
rather liberated by a new way of seeing our relation to our practices
and the rules that guide them. Wittgenstein’s lesson is for us to
recognize that our instructions on how to continue the series are
never fully bounded, never fully capable of determining all future
259
instantiations of the rule.
Concerning our practices involving rule following, Wittgenstein
makes the following observation: “When I obey a rule, I do not
260
choose. I obey the rule blindly.”
Obeying the rule blindly would
seem, on the surface, to capture precisely the image Justice
blindfolded means to convey: the formal structure of legal rules
leaves no room for bias or discretion, forcing the “hand of justice”
into blind obedience to the rule. Rails would indeed be our model,
for there is no need for fine discernment or perspicuous vision since
we can obey blindly. But obedience for Wittgenstein is not the ideal it
appears to be. Following a rule is what one does unreflectively—as
part of an ordinary practice for Wittgenstein. When one moves a
bishop diagonally in chess, for example, one follows the rule blindly.
In the normal course of engaging in activities and using language,
there is no room for doubt or indecision about how to proceed—one
simply acts, in a sense, blindly. Thus, obedience need not be a
261
cognitively reflective activity.
Stanley Fish uses the example of the Baltimore Orioles pitcher
Dennis Martinez whose guiding rule was to “[t]hrow strikes and keep

258. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 81e, § 201.
259. To say that one continues a series in a particular way because one has
interpreted the rule does not resolve the problem of rule-following⎯it merely
restates the problem. On this question of interpretation, Scott Hershovitz argues
that Wittgenstein has nothing to offer, and indeed he is correct. He is wrong,
however, to suggest that because Wittgenstein fails to contribute to a discussion of
rule interpretation, he fails to contribute to the general problem of rule skepticism
in legal theory. Scott Hershovitz, Wittgenstein on Rules: The Phantom Menace, 22
OXFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 619, 639-40 (2002).
260. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 85e, § 219.
261. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 41 (1975) (arguing that we
have reasons to act on the basis of rules whose justifications we do not ourselves
examine).
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262

‘em off the bases.” Fish argues that there is no relation between the
critically unreflective practice of doing what one does when one plays
baseball and any theory about what one ought to do. One simply
unreflectively acts. Likewise, Fish argues, the judge is engaged in
doing what she already does, and thus identifies the crucial issues
263
The very act of obeying blindly for both
without reflection.
Wittgenstein and Fish is meant to mark the lack of rational reflection
when conducting our ordinary practices and activities. This normal
“blindness” does not mean that we cannot or should not reflect on
our practices, but merely that we normally do not. Furthermore, as
in the case of chess, reflection would actually undermine the activity,
since if we were to move the pieces in ways other than those specified
by the rule, in an important sense, we would no longer be playing
264
chess.
But Fish’s application of Wittgenstein’s thought here to the
practice of judging is suspect. We do not need to be self-conscious of
ordinary rules—the rules of games for instance—when we know how
to play. Fish’s sleight-of-hand is to analogize constitutive rules of a
game with guiding rules of a necessarily critically reflective practice—
that of judging.
Appearances notwithstanding, Wittgenstein’s response to the
skeptic—that we obey rules blindly—does not vindicate Justice
blinded in a critically unreflective position. Judicial decision-making
is not in its nature the sort of practice that should lead to
unreflective, blind adherence to practice or rule. There are
blindnesses, no doubt, and mechanical exercises analogous to
“throwing strikes.” But justice, or the practice of judging, is not
something that in itself can always be “followed blindly” because as
Wittgenstein demonstrates, rules are not fully determinate guides.
Just as no practice is everywhere circumscribed by rules (e.g., how
high to throw the ball in tennis when serving), the practice of judging
is not everywhere circumscribed. It is a practice always open to the
262. FISH, supra note 94, at 372.
263. Fish, Fish v. Fiss in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 94, at 122-23.
Fish imagines the command to a new judge that here are the rules, now go to work.
The new judge would soon find that she was unable to read the rules without
already having a working knowledge of the practices that were supposed to
order, or, to put it somewhat more paradoxically, she would find that she
could read the rules that are supposed to tell her what to do only when she
already knew what to do.
Id.
264. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 81e, § 201 (referring to the need for
actions, or chess moves, to accord with rules, not for the moves to be determined by
the rule alone).
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possibility of interruption and hesitancy that comes with noticing a
new aspect—of seeing a legal problem in an entirely new and
different light. Thus, Fish is guilty of generalizing from one kind of
ordinary case—viz., the automatic imposition of some kinds of
procedural rules, for instance—to the whole of judicial practice.
Indeterminacy of meaning in the law is not the only critical
concern, and certainly does not derive from Wittgenstein’s discussion
265
of rules. Accepting the proposition that we do not always engage in
our practices reflectively does not lead to quietism. But these
observations do suggest that the difficulty with vision is that we are
ordinarily blind to how it operates. Having a vision of the
Constitution as a whole influences actual practice and judicial
decisions. Having a view of particular facts and structures, while
remaining blind to others, is also a factor in legal practice and
decision. Each of these ways of employing vision are different, but
both point beyond to problems of legal interpretation.
Becoming aware that interpretation and indeterminacy are not the
whole game does not tell us what to do about our entrenched ways of
seeing. Changes do occur, practices and interpretations are never
fixed and final, but change is not always and only determined by
interpretation. Imagination plays a role too—the ability to see in
266
different ways than before.
Imagination was central to bringing
about through words the creation of a new nation, the bringing into
being of “We the People.” Change occurs through projecting new
visions onto the future. Because judges must adopt a view of the law
as a limited whole or in part, imagination engages legal thinking as
267
Vision is therefore not merely a form of
another form of vision.
265. For approaches that have tried to derive strong indeterminacy positions from
Wittgenstein, see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, supra note 47, at 781. See
also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391-92 (1982) (“It would
obviously be nice to believe that my Constitution is the true one and, therefore, that
my opponent’s versions are fraudulent, but that is precisely the belief that becomes
steadily harder to maintain. They are simply different Constitutions. There are as
many plausible readings for the United States Constitution as there are versions of
Hamlet . . . .”); Charles M. Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613, 623-24
(1987) (surveying the claim that it is impossible to achieve a determinate view of
rules).
266. See NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 1-12 (describing the literary
imagination’s relationship to justice); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial
Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477, 1480 (1995) (advocating
the measured use of imagination to supplement judicial reasoning); see also SHELDON
WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION (1960). Wolin argues that “political philosophy
constitutes a form of ‘seeing’ political phenomena,” id. at 17, which employs
imagination as a key means to lessen “the gap between the possibilities grasped
through political imagination and the actualities of political existence.” Id. at 20.
267. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 207-11 (1985) (describing the
lawyer’s role as a translation of imagination through the power of language).
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legal constraint, as are rules. Vision also embodies a constructive
possibility of progress and transformation, an ability to attend to new
matters of concern.
As Part IV will argue, legal meanings and rules are never settled
absolutely and finally, but are always open to forming part of new
ways of seeing in the future. Because the future will take shape
through the particular matters to which constitutional culture
attends, judging is, more than anything, a way of seeing. Thus, vision
268
and blindness will be the unavoidable conversational foils. It is the
tension between vision and blindness, not only the tension between
269
interpretation and text, upon which we should critically focus.
IV. VISION AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS
When scholars and judges write about having a view of the law,
adopting a particular vision of the law, shutting the court’s eyes to
problems, or adopting a different vision, the visual metaphor is
frequently deployed at moments of proposed legal change. First,
either through adopting various levels of scrutiny, or seeing or failing
to see social structural impacts claimed through constitutional
provisions, vision matters to law. Second, interpretation occurs
always within a field of vision. Judges cannot interpret what they
cannot see. Legal change and transformation can no doubt occur
through the simple adoption of a new interpretation and new
application of settled principles to new situations. Transformation,
however, also requires adopting a new vision of a domain of law. The
transformation the Court’s economic substantive due process analysis
270
that occurred in cases such as West Coast Hotel v. Parrish and Carolene
271
Products is on the one hand a complex story, and on the other hand,
at least schematically, quite simple.
The Court adopted a new way of looking at its institutional role in
limiting government economic regulations. The mistake of Lochner
was in its vision of what liberty in the due process clause requires, not
268. This is not to deny the importance of speech or text. See generally Heidi
Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the
Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 (1995).
269. This point is by way of contrast to Stanley Fish:
In both law and literature it is ways of reading, inseparable from the fact of
the institution itself, and not rules or special kinds of texts that validate and
justify the process of rational interpretation, whether it leads to the
rendering of a clear-cut legal decision or to the demonstration that what is
valuable about a poem is its resolute refusal to decide.
FISH, supra note 94, at 138 (emphasis added).
270. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
271. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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in failing interpretively to understand the meaning of the due process
text. The New Deal constitutional moment was the product of a
gestalt shift changing the way the Court sees, how liberty in the due
process clause fits within social practices, and how due process is
connected to other constitutional values. The “switch in time,”
importantly involved a “switch in vision.”
As a way of explaining the “switch in time,” Bruce Ackerman’s
theory of constitutional moments also relies implicitly on the notion
272
of vision.
Beginning from a background state of normal politics,
Ackerman’s account of constitutional transformations requires a
series of incremental institutional changes that give rise to a moment
273
of profound legal and political change.
He schematizes these
institutional changes as requiring triggering elections, repeated
returns to the people for further authorization, elections that
confirm the legal transformation, and the capitulation by the
274
opposition to change.
Periods of normal politics may be
punctuated by the occasional period of constitutional politics in
which “We the People” express our political will to bring about
275
constitutional transformation.
The process of constitutional
change may lead to a constitutional moment in which a constitutional
transformation occurs, such as the transformation wrought by the
New Deal. After such a transformation, “We the People” recede back
into normal politics having changed the constitutional landscape
276
through unconventional processes. What guides the constitutional
transformation, however, is a new vision of some aspect of
constitutional culture. Resistance to the change also occurs as a
rejection of the new vision in favor of the old. Although the debate
may touch on issues of constitutional interpretation, the real issue in
a constitutional moment is the adoption of a new way of seeing our
constitutional commitments and our institutional practices, guided
by new values and priorities.
Mark Tushnet develops an alternative theoretical framework,
which is concerned with what he calls “constitutional orders,” in
terms of vision as well. Constitutional orders are relatively stable
institutional arrangements through which the people make
277
principled decisions. Tushnet identifies the New Deal-Great Society

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 273.
Id. at 23-75.
See id. at 25-31, 306-11 (identifying the 1934 election as a triggering election).
Id. at 309-11.
Id.
MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 1-2 (2003).
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constitutional order as having dominated political institutions and as
having provided guiding principles for setting policy and making
278
political as well as judicial decisions. Constitutional orders, though
enduring, are not never-ending. We are living through the change to
a new constitutional order, which Tushnet argues began to emerge in
279
1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan as president. Within the
judiciary, the new order has manifested itself in a bevy of new
constitutional decisions that have altered fundamental institutional
arrangements relating to federalism, the Commerce Clause, the role
of state sovereign immunity, the enforcement of civil rights
legislation, as well as more specific doctrinal areas such as takings and
280
free speech. Tushnet describes the new order generally in terms of
vision: “The new order’s vision of justice . . . is one in which
government provides the structure for individuals to advance their
281
own visions of justice.” The idea of a constitutional order is related
to Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, in that both
theories depend on the ways that constitutional actors are guided by
over-arching visions of constitutional order and change. Again, these
visions may be described in terms of differing constitutional
interpretations, but they sweep far more broadly by articulating
different ways of seeing institutional arrangements, individual
obligations, and the role of rights. Hence, a change in constitutional
order flows from a change in vision.
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson recognize the central role that
vision plays in constitutional order and change. They write: “The
fight over the Constitution is a fight over contrasting political visions,
a fight over contrasting narratives of American history, and a fight
over contrasting conceptions of We the People and its deepest
282
commitments.”
According to Balkin and Levinson, the fight over
constitutional vision occurs through the process of partisan
283
entrenchment.
When political partisans gain control over the
political branches, they are able to extend temporally their control
through lifetime appointments to the federal judiciary. Partisan
entrenchment may be nothing new, as Federalist attempts to
entrench their power in the judiciary leading up to Marbury v.

278. Id. at 8-9.
279. See id. (adding that the new order has been consolidated since the election of
the Republican majority House and Senate in 1994).
280. Id. at 33-70.
281. Id. at 2.
282. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1094.
283. Id. at 1066.
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284

Madison amply illustrate. When judges share an overall vision of
constitutional order, they are able to enshrine that vision through
enduring constitutional decisions. Thus, partisan political change
can be leveraged into constitutional transformation. They argue that
this is precisely what has occurred more recently under the Rehnquist
285
Even more
revolution, and continues apace after Bush v. Gore.
critically, they argue that a partisan court, acting outside its authority,
decided the 2000 election in order to ensure that the political
branches would sustain the new constitutional vision and further
286
entrench that vision through additional judicial appointments.
Partisan entrenchment is a theory designed to understand what
Balkin and Levinson identify as the current constitutional
287
revolution.
Although different constitutional interpretations are at stake, what
guides the revolution is a new vision of constitutional order and
constitutional culture. Thus, I agree that the “point is that it is
contending visions, rather than judicial craft, that should be at the
288
At the level of contending
heart of the contemporary debate.”
visions, what is required is that each side provide a narrative
articulation of their constitutional vision. From within a particular
way of seeing, for example the Equal Protection Clause, there is little
indeterminacy of meaning requiring interpretation. It is only when
one disagrees with the animating vision that one typically raises an
objection to a particular interpretation. Thus, the mechanisms of
transforming constitutional visions are far more important than the
mechanics of interpretation that operate from within a particular
vision.
Given that it is possible to see the same text as the same text, yet
have an entirely different constitutional vision, it is important to
understand the nature of such changes in vision. In order to see how
changes of vision are possible while at the same time the putative
object of vision remains the same, it will be useful to first confront a
particular epistemological puzzle involving vision, the contexts in
which this puzzle arises, and a solution provided through application
of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought.

284. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing principle of judicial review).
285. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law
and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1435 (2001) .
286. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1097-99.
287. Id. at 1066-70.
288. Id. at 1094.
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A. The Molyneux Problem
Vision has preoccupied Western thought at least since Rene
Descartes hypothesized that the central epistemological problem in
philosophy is how the mind’s eye processes retinal images as
289
representations of entities exterior to the mind.
Although for
Descartes, the mind turns its vision inward to a reflection of ideas, for
later British epistemologists the mind becomes a mirror of nature,
and the philosophical problem becomes how to account for the
290
relationship between seeing and that which is seen. On this model,
however, the suspicion developed that the eye does not reflect a
reality independent of the mind, but that what the eye sees—the
visual field—is a reflection of a visual and linguistic construction of
the world, not a representation of the world somehow rendered
independent. For instance, Michel Foucault writing about the
construction of new modes of scientific knowledge which depended
on the development of new ways of seeing suggests that the “eye
becomes the depositary and source of clarity; it has the power to
bring a truth to light that it receives only to the extent that it has
291
brought it to light.”
Moreover, the centralization of vision as the
dominant means of knowledge, when connected to official methods
of exercising political power, leads to refined methods of surveillance
292
for which the panopticon is the much-discussed paradigm.
Foucault’s work demonstrates how vision begins as a pure problem of
epistemology only to become a means not only of knowledge, but of
social and political control.
289. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS AND
CORRESPONDENCE 132-33 (Roger Ariew ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 2000) (1641).
290. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 45 (1980). See
generally IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? (1975)
(examining problems in metaphysics and epistemology that have been influenced by
theories about language).
291. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL
PERCEPTION xiii (Alan Sheridan trans., 1973) (1963); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT,
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 250 (Richard Howard trans., 1965) (1961) (“The science
of mental disease, as it would develop in the asylum, would always be only of the
order of observation and classification.”).
292. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 20009 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975) (analyzing the historical and political
significance of Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 treatise on the model prison). The issue of
visibility and control is not confined to the penological context, but is central to
understanding many current issues including those of privacy. See JEFFREY ROSEN,
THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 1-12 (2000)
(discussing the analog between the Clinton impeachment and the erosion of privacy
in American culture); Daniel Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2001) (discussing the
use of panoptic and Kafkaesque metaphors in understanding the threats to privacy
caused by database collection of private information).
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Seeing the world in one particular way is not fully determined by
an objective reality accurately represented through sight. In the most
general way, one has a world-view that is likely shared by many and
shaped through collective experience. In a particular way, one sees
the world from a particular place that is likely shared by no other and
shaped through individual experience. Visual experience is the
organizing force to human knowledge and understanding according
to enlightenment philosophy and must synthesize publicly shared
conceptions with individual experience. Because vision played a
central role in enlightenment thought, tellingly, puzzles over
blindness were given considerable attention, suggesting that vision is
organized by its relation to blindness.
Consider, for example, the famous Molyneux problem
contemplated by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding—“Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and
taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere . . .
293
be made to see,” could he by sight be made to distinguish the two?
Locke’s friend William Molyneux raised this question in a letter and
Locke’s answer was that such a person would not be able to
294
distinguish the two.
This question seems to have been the question of the time, and was
raised, with varying answers, by Bishop Berkeley, Leibniz, and
295
Diderot, among others.
Locke’s answer to the puzzle is no. The
man born blind who learned to feel the differences between shapes
such as spheres and cubes would not be able to identify a cube or a
296
sphere by sight. Knowledge one has about the world through touch
isolated from vision does not provide one with visual knowledge
without first having to coordinate between vision and touch.
More than 300 years later, Oliver Sacks had occasion to confirm
Locke’s answer empirically in his interaction with Virgil, a man whose
297
sight was restored as a mature adult. After a surgical procedure to
remove the cataracts from Virgil’s eyes, he was thrust into a
bewildering world of visual detail—most of which he was completely
293. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 145-49 (Peter
Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689).
294. Id. at 146.
295. See, e.g., George Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 47-48 (M. R. Ayers ed., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1975) (1709)
(arguing that the blind man would be able to distinguish the cube because he knows
that the cube is composed of square surfaces); G. W. LEIBNIZ, NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 255-56 (Jonathan Bennett & Peter Remnant eds., 1981); Denis
Diderot, Lettre Sur Les Aveugles (Robert Niklaus ed., 1970).
296. LOCKE, supra note 293, at 146.
297. Oliver Sacks, To See and Not See, in ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 108 (1995).
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unable to process. Though he could “see” he remained cognitively
blind, an agnosic unable to connect the images he could “see” with
299
An
the lived and tactile experiences of his world as a blind man.
agnosic is a person, like Vigil, who is able to “see,” but unable to
understand what he is seeing and unable to integrate visual
300
experience with other sensations.
With regard to the figure of Justitia, an agnosic condition would
mean that once the blindfold is lifted from the blind goddess’s eyes,
she would not be able to tell the difference between the sphere and
cube by sight without the aid of touch. More generally, the judge,
the legal practitioner, or the legal theorist who had an experience of
a phenomenon blind, would, when sight is restored, not be able to
integrate the new visual experience with the pre-visual experience of
the same or similar phenomenon. What does the prospect of agnosia
mean for legal theory and practice? Perhaps no such condition exists
for the metaphorical blindness that Justitia experiences.
On the one hand, there is a world of difference between
constrained vision of the kind that courts have and physical blindness
of the Molyneux hypothetical. On the other hand, the more vision is
directed and constrained in the legal context the more opportunities
there are for slippages between how courts understand the field of
legal vision and how persons without such visual handicaps would
understand the same field. To the extent that what courts and legal
practitioners see needs to map onto what the broader legal and
constitutional culture of a society sees, there will remain the prospect
for a form of agnosia. As this Article has already canvassed, cases of
structural claims like those of McCleskey present precisely this kind of
gap between what can be seen through a particular legal lens, and
301
what the broader legal culture can see.
Thus, it is plausible to conclude that the agnosic condition creates
problems for the imaginative exercise of legal theories that rely on
vision and blindness. At some level legal practitioners must learn to
integrate blind experiences into visual experiences. And when it
comes to the practice of judging, there must be some suitable
geographic mapping of the decision reached through blinded and
constrained sight and our broader view of justice in society gained
through all the coordinated senses that are involved when attending
to an issue or problem. Stephen Carter diagnoses the problem with
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 140-41.
Bright, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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cases like McCleskey as a problem of agnosia. He writes, “the problem
is not an inability to remember the past, but an incapacity to
302
integrate the present.”
Such geographic mapping of law’s field of vision, however, is not
the same thing as translating meanings over time. In order to
account for fidelity to the text over time, Lawrence Lessig, for
example, has proposed that we understand the process of
303
constitutional interpretation as a process of translation.
The
problem here goes beyond translating a fixed text into different
304
cultural “languages” during different times and circumstances;
rather, the problem here is the broader one of coming to see the
relevance, or a meaning, or the comparative significance of a
constitutional provision in light of other ways of seeing the law. Each
change in vision requires integration with those parts of one’s vision
that remain unchanged. Rather than fidelity to a text, the problem is
retaining a kind of fidelity to consistency and coherence between old
and new meanings (old and new ways of seeing).
What needs explaining is how transformations in legal thought can
occur in ways that do not depend upon developing a new
interpretation, and do not depend on exploiting the Constitution’s
open texture or law’s indeterminacy. The new problem is that when
we do enact a transformation, it is not clear that we will readily be
able to integrate the new vision with the unchanged aspects of the
old. The possibility of a radical transformation⎯suddenly seeing
what previously went unseen⎯entails the need to integrate what is
now seen within the background way of seeing before.
The solution to this as well as the Molyneux problem is found in
the recognition that blindness is not a state to overcome, by merely
removing the veil, but is a necessary concomitant to a “way of seeing”
embedded in social practice. When we undergo a revolution in a way
of seeing, the revolution takes some time to pervade all aspects of
constitutional culture. For example, the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through due process was brought about by a transformation in
how we view constitutional rights and liberties as limiting the

302. Carter, supra note 140, at 441.
303. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1993)
(“The translator’s task is always to determine how to change one text into another
text, while preserving the original text’s meaning.”). See generally Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995)
(explaining how new readings of the Constitution may maintain fidelity with past
understandings of the document’s meaning and purpose).
304. See Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1457,
1466-67 (1997) (rejecting importance of “translation”).
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305

behavior of states. The process of incorporation, however, spanned
306
In the meantime, a new way of seeing must live
over thirty years.
alongside other ways of understanding that themselves may operate
like an undercurrent, waiting for the chance to dominate the primary
flow.
At the level of constitutional politics, it may be the case that there is
no reconciling the one way of seeing with the other, and that the
transformation from one to the other will produce a strong version of
the Molyneaux problem, a difficulty in reconciling a constitutional
vision with beliefs and practices developed by a different
constitutional vision. For many, the problem with cases like Roe v.
307
Wade has been an inability to integrate the decision within their
broader worldview.
Not all attempts to settle significant
constitutional and moral questions are entirely successful in resolving
competing worldviews, and thus full transformation is not always
possible.
Turning again to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought, it is important to
recognize that social practice is conducted on the basis of negotiating
between different states of vision and blindness in order to construct
contingently settled, holistically coherent visions.
B. Wittgenstein on Changing Visions
The problems of translation, the problems with moving between
two entirely different ways of seeing, are important because much
political and constitutional argument is about contending visions.
Sometimes, it appears that legal practitioners are completely unable
to see the other side, and are therefore unable to imagine what life is
like from within the other vision. Justice Brown notoriously writes for
the Court in Plessy in response to the claim of racial stigmatization by
separate facilities, “[i]f this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put

305. The transformation traces its roots to cases like Gitlow v. New York. See 268
U.S. 652, 630 (1925) (holding under due process that States must comply with Free
Speech Clause); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (applying
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660
(1961) (applying Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures to states); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding states
cannot convict on basis of testimony obtained from torture).
306. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (incorporating First Amendment right to
association).
307. See 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (striking down state law criminalizing abortion
as violating fundamental liberty).
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308

that construction upon it.”
Justice Brown is unable to see what
Justice Harlan sees, that “[t]here is no caste here. Our constitution is
309
color-blind . . . .” There is, however, another kind of blindness that
can occur even for one capable of seeing an object, but incapable of
seeing it in a certain light—what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls aspect
310
blindness.
Justice Brown may be aspect blind to the effects and
311
harms of regulating “civil rights solely upon the basis of race.”
Wittgenstein introduces the idea of “seeing an aspect” to call
attention to the multivalent ways of seeing what is putatively the
312
“same” object.
Consider the rather mundane example of
313
Viewed in one
psychologist Joseph Jastrow’s duck/rabbit figure.
way the figure is a duck. Viewed in another way, the figure is a rabbit,
thereby calling attention to the ability to see two very different
“things” in one and the same simple figure. Manifestation of what
one sees—a duck or a rabbit—occurs in how one describes what one
sees. Does one speak of bills, webbed feet, and water, or does one
speak of ears, fur, and the forest? It is possible to see only the duck
or only the rabbit, and thus be blind to the different aspects under
which the figure can be seen.
The puzzle over the ability to see different aspects is that “[t]he
expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new
perception and at the same time of the perception’s being

308. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding constitutionality
of doctrine of “separate but equal”).
309. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
310. See generally WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 213e. Wittgenstein has been
employed in legal theory discussions by others as a source for the indeterminacy
thesis, by way of what is known as his rule-following argument. E.g., Charles M.
Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problems of Legal
Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 929-31 (1985). Wittgenstein has been invoked in
other contexts, not to support indeterminacy, but for his general discussions of rules
and language games. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice &
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 942-46 (1990) (arguing Wittgenstein is central to
modern philosophy’s turn to language). But see Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory
(without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 102 (2005) (resisting selfconsciously the urge to cite to Wittgenstein as a philosophical source for the
indeterminacy thesis). Little or no discussion has been devoted to the relevance of
Wittgenstein’s discussion of noticing an aspect, nor does this discussion provide
grounds for a deeply entrenched indeterminacy thesis. But see Stephen C. Root,
Trade Dress, the “Likelihood of Confusion,” and Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Seeing As”: The
Tangled Landscape of Resemblance, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 757 (2000) (applying
Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing as to tests for likelihood of confusion of trade
dress).
311. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
312. Wittgenstein writes, “I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its
likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet, I see it differently. I call
this experience ‘noticing an aspect.’” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, at 193.
313. Id. at 194.
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314

unchanged.”
This phenomenon of seeing an aspect allows us to
speak in terms of “seeing-as.” We see, for example, a criminal
defendant as deserving the appropriate due process protections. We
see a just society as requiring a proper distribution of goods. We see
regular features of our practices and interactions with other persons
in a particular light for particular purposes, and we focus on salient
features of our visual field as particularly relevant to those practices
and purposes.
Recognizing that all seeing can be expressed as a way of “seeing-as”
highlights three features of a way of seeing: the background
conditions, practices, and assumptions that inform how we see; the
actual visual sensation of seeing; and the response to that seeing
which is inseparable from the act of seeing itself. This latter feature,
radically re-orients how we understand seeing because any act of seeing
is a kind of responding. Thus, for Wittgenstein, action and perception
are intimately connected, such that an ability, for example, to see
another person in need is bound up with a response (or conscious
315
decision not to respond) to that need.
But if perception is a matter of noticing an aspect, then there is
also the open possibility of infelicity in ways of seeing. We can get it
wrong, in much the same way as J. L. Austin calls attention to the
ever-present possibility of infelicity and misfire in our use of
316
language.
What might become a settled habit of seeing things in
one way, must be open to the ever-present possibility of what
Wittgenstein calls the “dawning of an aspect.” For one who had
always seen only the duck in Jastrow’s figure, the sudden recognition
that the figure can also be a rabbit is the “dawning of an aspect.”
Settled ways of seeing must be open to the possibility of
interruption—of seeing in a new light because the nature of seeing is
such that new aspects may always dawn and coalesce where before we
had seen something only in a single light.
Applying this insight to how we understand legal disagreement,
especially at the level of constitutional politics, the goal is to adopt
strategies aimed at bringing the other side to adopt one’s vision of
317
the matter.
For the task is to put in question how the legal
314. Id. at 196.
315. See, e.g., DAVID COCKBURN, OTHER HUMAN BEINGS xiii (1991) (discussing how
there are “radical asymmetries in the attitudes which we take to be appropriate
towards ourselves and towards others”).
316. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 16-18 (1962) (comparing,
among misfires, “misinvocations” of procedure to “misexecutions”).
317. This involves the ability to shift our attention from what can be seen in the
foreground to what is visible in the background. Wittgenstein’s point is that every
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practitioner is inclined to see a given case, to approach a legal issue,
318
At the level of a particular
or to construct a claim in justice.
adjudication, each litigant tries to affect a judge or jury’s way of
looking at things. At the level of constitutional principle, litigants
and academics attempt to shape, in particular, an appellate judge’s
way of looking at things. And, at the level of policy we all engage in
dialogue aimed at changing the way legislators, judges, and fellow
citizens look at things.
Ways of seeing can be localized or more expansive. Within a
particular legal context and within a particular social practice,
adopting a new way of seeing may be nothing more than changing
how one rule is interpreted in a relatively contained area of life.
However, changing a way of seeing may also be far more expansive, as
when we come to adopt a new way of looking at the application of
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process to the states. Cases
319
320
such as Brown v. Mississippi and Moore v. Dempsey employed due
process to declare a constitutional restraint on the racially unjust
processes black criminal defendants faced in some state criminal
321
procedures. These cases and others wrought changes that pervade
the legal system and many social and legal practices, enabling
particular claims of justice to be heard in court, and signaling a
foreground is only contingently so, only against a background that is not as yet in
question, but is open to the possibility of itself forming part of the foreground as our
attention shifts. Transformation and conversion in ways of seeing depend on this
shifting visual capacity. See generally WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120. Bruce Ackerman
makes a similar point in terms of conversational constraints that limit what claims in
justice can be seen by what claims in justice can be said. BRUCE ACKERMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 24-37 (1984).
318. Stability in ways of seeing will exist so long as it does not occur to legal
practitioners to call into question background assumptions and blindnesses that
focus the way of seeing in a particular way. Conditions, however, may change and
new ways of seeing emerge that begin to put those background assumptions into play
in a way that may bring about a change in a way of seeing. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 89 (discussing changing legal paradigms in patterns of
agreement and disagreement when “[s]uddenly what seemed unchallengeable is
challenged, a new or even radical interpretation of some important part of legal
practice is developed in someone’s chambers . . . .”); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEG. EDUC. 518 (1986)
(discussing the “phenomenology of judging” in situation where judges bring
background rules into question); Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, supra
note 84, at 346-47 (noting that within any legal controversy “there are the ‘rules in
play,’ about which lawyers deploy professionally respectable arguments, and the
‘background rules’”).
319. See 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that convictions based on confessions
coerced through torture violate the Due Process Clause).
320. See 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (ruling mob-dominated trials violate the Due Process
Clause).
321. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding under due process
that in a capital trial, defendants must be given access to counsel).
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322

change in the country’s tolerance for racial injustice.
These cases
wrought a change in vision that profoundly began to change legal
practice, as well as made initial steps in the eventual systemic changes
undertaken by later civil rights decisions. Although ways of seeing
may be more or less localized or pervasive, as a matter of legal theory,
the scope of seeing will depend entirely upon the purposes legal
practitioners might have and the contingent situations that arise to
make possible a new way of seeing. Thus, as legal theory, when we
focus on changing ways of seeing, we need not hypothesize a legal
Hercules who must attempt to see the whole of legal practice from a
323
privileged position.
Ways of seeing can be changed from inside
existing practices through the dawning of new aspects.
The open possibility of interrupting a way of seeing things, the
existence of a state of never-fully settled practices and meanings,
suggests something else important for our discussion here. Legal
reasoning cannot always be a matter of deductive inferences from
settled doctrine. We do not always decide claims of justice by appeal
to what Roberto Unger calls “rationalizing legal analysis,” because
there is no single, settled meaning doctrinal principles already
324
have. Even when rationalizing legal analysis appears to have settled
some area of the law—e.g., Congress’s nearly unfettered use of the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation affecting interstate
commerce—some new turn in legal opinions may revive the specter
325
of the Lochner-era’s way of seeing, or some other yet to be
articulated way of seeing. Thus, even when principles of law appear
to be settled, they may in fact only be contingently settled, awaiting
some new circumstance, some new will to put into play new
326
arguments.
Ordinarily, legal practitioners reason by analogy to

322. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000) (discussing landmark cases of the 1930s which
altered the landscape of criminal procedure).
323. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000); DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE, supra note 31.
324. UNGER, supra note 245, at 34.
325. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding the right to free
contract was implicit within the Commerce Clause); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 was unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding federal
government had no authority to regulate firearms in school zones).
326. Mark Tushnet describes the indeterminacy thesis as claiming “that legal
propositions will be indeterminate when some socially significant group finds it
useful to raise legal claims that theretofore seemed frivolous; their arguments will
become first professionally respectable and then reasonably powerful as their social
or political power increases.” Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, supra note
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existing precedent and existing legal interpretations. Sometimes,
however, legal practitioners may seek to bring about a fundamental
change in the law having the effect of introducing a new way of
327
seeing to an old area of law. Arguably, Brown was such a case for
328
equal protection and Miranda v. Arizona for criminal procedure.
With new decisions come new visions of constitutional law, and with
new visions, a judge or justice can provide new constitutional
decisions, contributing to the on-going conversation within
constitutional culture.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Looking closely at the role of courts and the practice of judging, we
have observed how vision is endemic to the very practice of law. At
the end of the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, there is much talk about
329
the shift the Roberts Court is making. From new ways of seeing the
importance of colorblindness in school policy, to First Amendment
rights, to rights of access to the courts, the Roberts Court is
beginning to make manifest its vision of the Constitution. The
content of that vision remains obscure, perhaps even to the Roberts
Court itself, but what is clear is that substantive constitutional
decisions will be determined by that developing vision. We must
await further manifestations of what matters of concern will occupy
the attention of this new Court.
When we shift the focus from indeterminacy to vision in the law, we
see that the jurisprudential problem is not merely the fact that texts,
rules, and practices are indeterminate, but that these are all products
of the shifting perspectives of vision in the law. Jack Balkin writes
that “[n]o doubt legal interpretation begins with the text, but it can
330
hardly end there.” Although a narrow conception of interpretation
may begin with the text, the broader process of creating meaning in
law begins elsewhere. Legal interpretation begins with vision which
guides the selection of matters and texts to be interpreted. This is
not to say that interpretation is possible without the text, but neither

84, at 345. But see Coleman & Leiter, supra note 96, at 568-70 (discussing the concept
of semantic skepticism).
327. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
328. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (guaranteeing criminal suspects
the right to be informed of their right to counsel).
329. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1 (observing that the Roberts Court seems to be moving
in a more conservative direction).
330. Balkin, supra note 87, at 732.
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is it possible without a guiding vision. Regarding the Constitution,
the relation between interpretation and vision is central to the
process of creating constitutional culture and meaning.
On the need to understand the framers’ way of seeing in order to
begin to understand the Constitution, Amar writes, “only after we
understand their world and their original vision can we begin to
assess, in a self-conscious and systematic way, how much of this vision,
if any, has survived—or should survive—subsequent constitutional
331
developments.”
At key moments within broader legal and
constitutional culture, we may be “called upon to assess the durability
of a constitutional world built up by a generation and more of
juridical effort,” and decide with Ackerman “whether the old world
332
[is] dead, or worthy of continued preservation.”
Having a vision and inhabiting a constitutional world is to inhabit a
“normative universe . . . held together by the force of interpretive
commitments . . . [to] determine what law means and what law shall
333
be.”
In so inhabiting, our attention should be drawn first to the
geography of that vision and the way in which a vision of the law
shapes constitutional culture as well as our shared forms of life. If
interpretation always occurs within a vision of the law, then our first
questions should be about what we see and what we are able to see.
When we see that vision matters in the law, critical attention should
be drawn away from its fixation on interpretation and indeterminacy
to focus on the prior questions of constitutional vision.

331. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 7-8.
332. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 401.
333. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term–Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983).

